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Abstract

The three takings decisions that the Supreme Court issued at the end of its October 2004
Term marked a stunning reversal of the Court’s efforts the past three decades to use the Takings
Clause to define a set of constitutional property rights. The regulatory takings doctrine, which
once loomed as a significant threat to the modern regulatory state, now appears after Lingle v.
Chevron to be a relatively tame, if complicated, check on exceptional instances of regulatory
abuse. At the same time, the Public Use Clause, formerly an inconsequential limitation on the
state’s eminent domain authority, now appears ripe for revision and tightening after a stirring
four-justice dissent in Kelo v. City of New London and an enormous public protest decrying the
majority decision.
Notwithstanding this reversal, the 2005 decisions offer a coherent approach to Takings
Clause enforcement—albeit one that is likely to frustrate commentators, theorists, and property
rights advocates. More clearly than ever before, the Court in its 2005 decisions abandoned the
difficult, if not impossible, task of providing a clear normative justification for the Takings
Clause. Instead, its decisions reveal a marked preference for preserving and furthering its vision
of an institutional system of governance—a jurisprudence that is focused on the question of who
should decide rather than on the substantive issue of what should be decided, and that is
committed to the passive virtue of deference. In short, the Rehnquist Court explicitly chose to
adopt a “legal process” approach to takings. Because it privileges structure and process over
explicit considerations of substantive legal and normative issues, this approach is unsatisfactory
to property and constitutional theorists; because it defers to government decisions, it is
maddening to property rights advocates; and because it is technocratic and abstract, it is
unsatisfactory to the public. Given the prominence of the legal process approach to
constitutional review of state regulatory action in the post-New Deal era, however, judicial
passivity remains attractive, if unromantic, to judicial actors. Ultimately, recognizing the Court’s
shift away from defining constitutional property rights via the Takings Clause offers important
descriptive and prescriptive insights into the future of takings law in the Roberts Court,
especially if a majority of justices decide to tighten review of eminent domain actions or
otherwise heighten judicial review under the Takings Clause.
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[S]o we have to eat crow no matter what we do. Right?
- Justice Antonin Scalia, from the oral argument in
Lingle v. Chevron (2005)1
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s understanding and enforcement of the Takings Clause got
unexpectedly weird in the October 2004 term.2 Not so long ago, following the Supreme Court’s
four takings decisions in its 1986-87 term3 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission
(1992),4 the Takings Clause appeared ready to serve as a tool for the rollback of the regulatory
state.5 This vision proved illusory. Instead of a sharp, anti-statist tool, by October 2004 the
regulatory takings doctrine had come to resemble a sprawling experimental novel—poised to
resolve the deepest conflicts of modern life, yet filled with repetitious and highly technical
language that has never fully revealed the doctrine’s intent and implications, and understood only
by adepts able to master its subtle intricacies.6 Judges and academics had come to expect, if not
1

2005 WL 529658 (Feb. 22, 2005) (oral argument in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005)).
The Takings Clause, the Fifth Amendment, provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. It serves both to limit the exercise of eminent domain and to
require compensation for confiscatory regulations, and its application extends to state and federal governments. See
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897); DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 2-5 (2002).
3
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (condition that property owner dedicate
easement to public in order to receive land use approval effected a taking because the easement failed to bear an
essential nexus to the government’s purpose in requiring condition); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (remedy for regulatory takings violation is compensation, and property
owner may recover damages for taking during the period in which the regulation was in place); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987) (federal program that required small fractional ownership interests in tribal land escheat to tribe
upon owner’s death effected a taking by seizing one of the essential rights of property ownership, the right to pass
on property to heirs); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (legislation that
required coal companies to leave in place coal where mining would cause subsidence of surface did not effect a
taking).
4
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The property owner won in Lucas, and property owners won three of the four
decisions in the 1986-87 Term (Nollan, First English, and Hodel), while the only government victory was in
Keystone Bituminous, a seemingly anomalous decision that appeared to reverse the result in the first modern takings
case, decided by Justice Holmes in 1922, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5
This perception was most closely associated with Richard Epstein’s influential book Takings. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see generally
Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591,
641-63 (1998) (offering political and jurisprudential history of takings jurisprudence, with emphasis on its
increasingly conservative cast after the Warren Court).
6
Supreme Court justices themselves often make this complaint. See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is fair to say [that
regulatory takings] has proved difficult to explain in theory and to implement in practice. Cases attempting to decide
when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law.”); Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 866 (Stevens J., dissenting) (“Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the
scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence.”); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24
(1978) (identifying a regulatory taking “has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”). These complaints
2
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accept, the doctrine’s evolving complexity. At the same time, the Public Use Clause’s prospects
as a substantive limit on the exercise of eminent domain appeared dormant, if not dead.7 But in
three decisions issued in May and June 2005, the Court signaled broad consensus favoring an
end to major doctrinal development in regulatory takings while it cut the doctrine back at its
margins;8 and, paradoxically, revealed a dramatic and bitter split among the justices over the
meaning and bite of the public use limitation on eminent domain.9 And while the regulatory
takings cases—which Court-watchers once awaited eagerly—were issued with hardly any notice,
the eminent domain decision provoked a torrent of public outcry. This appears, on its face, to
constitute an odd reversal, one that cries out for theoretical explanation and prescriptive
intervention.
Alas, the search for coherence in takings jurisprudence has resulted in a multitude of
theories but no consensus. Each theory—whether based on conceptions of common law property
rights or constitutional conceptions of justice, or based on utility, natural law, or communitarian
or republican conceptions of the good—offers significant insight into the vexing legal, political,
and normative issues that judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause raises. But no single
theory of property or of constitutional limits on state regulation and expropriation has proven
capable either of satisfactorily rationalizing existing takings law or of persuading the courts or
the theory’s opponents that its approach is best. And as with their forbearers in the pantheon of
Supreme Court takings decisions, the decisions from 2005 failed to confirm the supremacy of
any one existing theory or approach.
The 2005 decisions do cohere—only not in the way we might think, expect, or even
prefer. They make plain that when faced with the difficult political and jurisprudential issues
raised by the relationship between private property and the regulatory state, the Court’s greatest
concern is with itself—that is, with the role of federal judicial review in a tri-partite, federalist
system. The Court has abandoned the difficult, if not impossible, task of providing a clear
normative justification for the Takings Clause in favor of preserving and furthering its vision of
an institutional system of governance. It has preferred to direct its takings jurisprudence towards
the question of who should decide rather than towards the substantive issue of what should be
decided. In short, the Court has chosen to adopt a “legal process” approach to takings—a

are nothing, however, compared to those lodged in the law reviews. For a recent comprehensive citation to that
literature, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 n.2
(2002).
7
See Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003,
39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251 (2004) (reporting that in the period between 1986 and 2003, the vast majority of
federal courts and a smaller, but still large majority of state courts upheld proposed takings against challenge under
public use clause); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 96 (1986)
[hereinafter Merrill, Economics of Public Use] (reporting that in the period between 1954-1986, no federal courts
and only a small minority of state courts held that a proposed taking failed to serve a public use).
8
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005) (invalidating test for regulatory takings that asks
whether a regulatory act “substantially advances” a legitimate state interest); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (under full faith and credit statute, a plaintiff whose federal
regulatory takings claim is resolved by a state court is precluded from re-litigating the claim in federal court).
9
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (“public use” requirement for exercise of eminent
domain under Fifth Amendment did not bar city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic
development plan that would result in acquired property’s use for private development).

2

jurisprudential commitment that did not begin in the 2005 decisions, but that has only become
truly clear after them.
The legal process approach to adjudication, with roots in the constitutional crisis raised
by the New Deal, ascended within the post-war legal academy as an effort to elaborate a
legitimating set of adjudicatory norms and institutional practices for the modern administrative
state.10 Several of the legal process school’s most significant concepts form the core of the 2005
decisions. The legal process approach commanded that judges should rely on “reasoned
elaboration” expressed in fulsome, consistent, and rational decisions;11 engage in a “maturing of
collective thought” through the careful, incremental exercise of common law development;12
and, ultimately, create and protect a self-limiting judicial institution that performs those tasks in
which it is competent.13 Courts, as one among many institutions of public and private
governance, have specific competencies within which they have authority to settle specific,
narrowly-focused questions; outside those competencies, however, courts should defer to the
expert decisions of other institutions. The fundamental questions for legal process adherents
concern the “constitutive or procedural understandings or arrangements” and “institutionalized
procedures” that serve as the source of substantive social arrangement and that enable those
arrangements to operate effectively.14 Thus, the key questions for courts and legal academics
concern which institutions should decide which questions, and what form and procedures should
be used in those decisional processes. The actual answers to those quests are significantly less
important.
Each of the 2005 decisions inevitably concerned the allocation of decision-making
authority within the institutionalized procedures of local land use decision-making. In Kelo v.
City of New London, its eminent domain case, the Court based its decision most clearly on the
majority’s respect for longstanding precedent and on the issue of whether “public use” is a
question better suited for legislative bodies or for courts.15 In San Remo v. City and County of
San Francisco, the Court based its decision on whether state courts could provide sufficient
review of claims brought under the federal constitutional takings clause, or whether judicial
review by the lower federal courts should be made available to takings plaintiffs.16 And in
Lingle v. Chevron, the Court both settled a niggling doctrinal issue by casting off an unreasoned
test from a twenty-five year old decision, and provided an authoritative elaboration of the precise
legal forms that compose the complicated regulatory takings doctrine.17 Decided unanimously,
Lingle offered a settled logic, made operational through a mixture of default standards and
categorical rules, by which courts should decide when and precisely how much to defer to the
administrative decisions of federal, state, and local government agencies. In sum, these
decisions, which represent a nearly random sample of substantive and procedural takings issues,
10

See infra notes 277-281.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 145-50 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
12
Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 100 (1959).
13
HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 696, 1009-11.
14
Id. at 3-4.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 120-122.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 49-63.
11
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provide an institutional blueprint for the protection of constitutional property rights rather than a
definition of the boundaries and normative justification of those rights.18
The article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the 2005 decisions, placing them in
the context of takings decisions of the past fifty years. Part II sorts and summarizes prevailing
theories of takings and explains the extent to which the Court relies on the competing rationales
of fairness, utility, and the institution of property rights as a basis for its enforcement of the
Takings Clause. Reviewing the Court’s stated rationales for its 2005 decisions, I argue that the
Court relies slightly on an abstract conception of fairness, somewhat more on property rights as
an institution, and hardly at all on utilitarian rationales. Part III shifts towards an institutionalist
perspective by considering, but then rejecting as incomplete, an argument that federalist
principles are the principal motivation behind the Court’s takings decisions. In Part IV, I explain
the legal process approach and demonstrate its remarkable salience throughout the 2005
decisions, and then summarize the descriptive and predictive implications of this insight.
Recognizing the legal process concepts at the core of the 2005 decisions enables a better
understanding of the frustrations of takings doctrine for commentators, theorists, and property
rights activists, and, at least with respect to Kelo, a large segment of the American public. The
recognition also identifies the jurisprudential limitations facing the Roberts Court if it decides to
reinvigorate the Takings Clause as a powerful check on state actions.
I.

Takings 2005

A.
Pre-2005
Viewed as abstractly and uncontroversially as possible, takings doctrine and logic prior to
the three decisions issued in the spring of 2005 had developed as follows. The Takings Clause
text is ambiguous,19 and the framers provided relatively little guidance as to their intent.20
18

The Fifth Amendment in fact contains two clauses that protect private property rights against interference
by state actors: the aforementioned Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Although the 2005 decisions and this Article occasionally
discuss the Due Process Clause in its substantive manifestation, my concern with “constitutional property rights”
extends only to how the Court has used its takings decisions to define them. See, e.g., infra notes 49-52 (discussing
Lingle’s distinction between the substantive due process and takings inquiries). For a significant recent effort to
provide a comprehensive and coherent theory of constitutional property rights that includes substantive and
procedural due process rights to property and the Takings Clause, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000).
19
By this I mean ambiguous as to at least two key issues: the meanings of the words “taken” and “public
use.” U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”)
(emphasis added). As to “taken,” it was unclear until the twentieth century that the term “taken” extended outside
the context of eminent domain; and, at the moment that the extension was recognized, the precise point at which a
regulation effects a taking was immediately deemed a “question of degree” that could not be resolved “by general
propositions.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). As to “for public use,” which in the
Fifth Amendment serves to modify “taken,” the phrase lends itself to multiple interpretations: the phrase might
merely limit the Clause’s command to eminent domain actions generally; or it may require government to pay
compensation only when it takes property for public uses rather than for private uses; or it may allow the
government to take property only for public uses, while prohibiting takings for private uses. Since the nineteenth
century, courts have settled on the latter plausible interpretation as the correct one. See DANA & MERRILL, supra
note 2, at 193-94.
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Neither English or colonial practices,21 nor the views of commentators who inspired the
constitutional framers,22 nor the early years of the Clause’s enforcement by the U.S. Supreme
Court and state supreme courts provide clear evidence of its meaning.23 In light of this
confusion, two contested issues have come to predominate the Takings Clause’s modern
development: the extent to which it requires compensation for government regulation that
diminishes the value of private property (as opposed to the forced sale imposed on property
owners via eminent domain); and the extent to which the “public use” phrase limits
government’s power to “take” property through its power of eminent domain.24 These issues
were at stake in two of the 2005 decisions.
With respect to regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has typically, although not
universally, allowed government to regulate broadly against nuisance activities and thereby
lower private property value without compensation, especially where the regulation provided
reciprocal benefits to the affected property owner.25 Over the course of the twentieth century,
government entities, and especially local governments, expanded the use of their police powers
to regulate a vast array of land uses through a myriad of planning techniques. During this period,
the Court had deferentially reviewed these regulatory efforts’ effects on individual property
owners, although the Court had developed tests that require courts to apply more rigorous
scrutiny for certain categories of regulations and regulatory effects.26 For regulations that do not
fall within such categories, the Court had interpreted the Takings Clause to require compensation
only when a regulation goes “too far,”27 a standard applied through “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.”28 Critics of the doctrine complain strenuously of its incoherence and vagueness.29
20

See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 539-40 (1995). But see
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49
AM. U. L. REV. 181, 192-206 (1999) (arguing that Madison’s writings provide sufficient evidence of the framers’
intent).
21
See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1252 (1996); William Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 557-66
(1972).
22
See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 19-25.
23
See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790 (1995). The historiography of the origins and early understandings
of the Takings Clause, which matured significantly in the early- and mid-1990s and found little evidence of strong
judicial enforcement (see, e.g., Hart, supra, and Treanor, supra), has since been contested. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 137 (3d ed. 2005) (citing articles
challenging Hart and Treanor’s work). My purpose here is not to sort and evaluate the various historical claims, but
to note that history does not dispositively provide an absolutely authoritative approach to the Takings Clause.
24
Admittedly, the narrative provided here ignores issues of just compensation and procedure. I consider
these important and frequently litigated issues, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 169 (noting that
compensation challenges arise frequently in eminent domain litigation); 254-55 (noting the importance of procedural
issues for the land development industry), throughout the article and omit them here only for purposes of narrative
economy.
25
See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the “Harm/Benefit” and “Average Reciprocity of Advantage” Rules in a
Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1458-72, 1490-1520 (1997); Andrea L. Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property
Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 110-11 (1990).
26
See infra notes 63-64.
27
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
28
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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Although the Rehnquist court seemed to shift towards imposing stronger constitutional property
protections, the regulatory takings doctrine had not changed radically since its re-emergence in
the 1978 Penn Central decision.30 As recently as 2002, the Court characterized its takings
jurisprudence as a consistent effort to resist creating broad per se rules that would impose strict
compensation requirements on regulatory entities.31
With respect to the public use issue in eminent domain, federal courts did not generally
review eminent domain action during the nineteenth century, and state courts failed to enunciate
a singular approach to the limits of government’s taking powers.32 During the twentieth century,
and especially over the past fifty years, state and federal courts have allowed government entities
to take land and ultimately give or sell the property to private individuals for a public purpose,
rather than strictly for public use, so long as the government could demonstrate that the land was
taken for a public purpose and would result in public benefits.33 More recently, property rights
advocates have had some success in persuading state courts to scrutinize eminent domain
actions, most prominently when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed an especially deferential
public use precedent.34
The settled context for the Court’s 2005 decisions, then, featured regulatory takings as a
complicated but increasingly stable area of law, and “public use” as a fairly simple, well-settled
limit on eminent domain power.
B.
Lingle: A Reasoned Elaboration of Regulatory Takings
At first glance, Lingle appears to be an uncontroversial effort at doctrinal housekeeping
that is intended only to clarify whether courts should continue to apply a “would-be doctrinal
rule or test” that had been repeated, though never directly applied, “in a half dozen or so”
Supreme Court decisions.35 The decision is brief, clear, and unanimous—ironically, Lingle is
probably the shortest takings decision since Agins v. City of Tiburon,36 the decision it revises,
29

See Poirier, supra note 6, at 97-98 nn.2-3 (citing sources). Some commentators have found virtue in the
doctrine’s vagueness, however. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, in PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION 199, 219-21 (1994); Poirier, supra note 6, at 150-83.
30
Commentators on the right and left have come to this conclusion. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private
Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187 (2004) (conservative natural rights advocate expressing
profound disappointment); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (1993) (liberal environmentalist noting the limits
of the Rehnquist Court’s efforts to reconstruct property and takings law).
31
See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002).
32
See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
204-14 (1978) (describing minor role for federal courts prior to the Fourteenth Amendment’s extension of Fifth
Amendment rights under the Takings Clause to states).
33
See James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,” and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 850-53.
34
See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (reversing Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)); Southwestern Illinois Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City
Environmental, L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002). See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Public Use Requirement and
Doctrinal Renewal, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10999 (2004) (noting reversal of judicial deference towards eminent domain
actions for economic development).
35
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2077-78.
36
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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and the first major takings decision since Agins to be issued without a significant concurrence or
dissent.37 Under review in Lingle was Hawaii’s legislative effort to cap the amount of rent that
an oil company could charge dealers to whom the company leased its gas stations. The
legislation was enacted in order to address concerns about the price effects of market
concentration in retail gasoline sales.38 In its complaint challenging the legislation, Chevron, the
Lingle plaintiff, included, among other claims, an allegation that the legislation effected a facial
taking of its property for which compensation was due.39 For this claim, Chevron relied upon the
first prong of a test that had originated in the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision Agins v. City of
Tiburon, which stated that a legislative act effects a taking if it “does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, . . . or [it] denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”40
After a trial at which each side called expert witnesses to testify to the legislation’s
practical effect, the federal district court ultimately accepted the view of Chevron’s economist
that the rent cap provision would not advance the state’s interest in protecting consumers from
high gasoline prices, and would in fact result in a price increase.41 Indeed, the only issue for
which the district court granted summary judgment, and the only issue on appeal, was the
plaintiff’s claim that the regulation, on its face, failed to advance the purpose for which the
government had adopted it.42 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the
legal standard to Chevron’s facial taking claim, and, ultimately, its finding that a taking had
occurred.43 Consistent with some state and federal appellate courts’ application of Agins,44

37

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lingle was very brief and unsubstantial. See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2087
(Kennedy, J., concurring); infra note 66.
38
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078.
39
Id. at 2079.
40
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
41
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D.Haw. 2002). The expert reasoned that
oil companies would most likely raise wholesale gasoline prices to offset losses resulting from the rental cap. See
id. The case had been remanded to the district from the Ninth Circuit following an appeal of the district court’s
earlier grant of summary judgment to Chevron. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(D.Haw. 1998). The remand required the court to settle a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the state’s rent
cap legislation would benefit consumers. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1037-42 (9th Cir.
2000).
42
See Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1014; see also Brief for Respondent at *1-*3, Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2074
(No. 04-163), 2005 WL 103793 (focusing almost exclusively on whether legislation “substantially advances a
legitimate state interest,” while noting only cursorily that plaintiff had been deprived of property from rent cap);
Brief of Appellee, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-15867), 2002 WL
32290809 (same).
43
The Ninth Circuit twice upheld the legal standard that the District Court used. See Chevron, 363 F.3d at
849-55; Chevron, 224 F.3d at 1033-37.
44
See, e.g., Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating
affordable housing ordinance for failure to substantially advance a state interest); cf. Clajon Production Corp. v.
Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1579 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Agins test to conclude that restriction on issuance of hunting
licenses to out-of-state hunters substantially advanced Wyoming’s legitimate interest in conserving game animals
for its residents); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (N.Y. 2004) (applying Agins test to conclude
that restriction on development in conservation areas substantially advanced Town’s legitimate interest in preserving
environmentally sensitive areas); Sheffield Development Company, Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660,
677 (Tex. 2004) (holding that Agins test remained authoritative and, as such, City’s downzoning and moratorium on
development of landowner’s parcel substantially advanced City’s interest in avoiding ill effects of urbanization).
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though counter to the majority of law review commentary,45 the lower courts in Lingle read the
test disjunctively to mean that compensation was due if a plaintiff could show that the
government regulation failed either prong of the test—even in the absence of evidence that the
regulation, as applied, diminished the use or value of plaintiff’s property.
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Lingle was whether the Agins
“substantially advances” test was an “appropriate” one for determining whether a regulation
effects a taking.46 The “substantially advances” test did not belong within takings jurisprudence,
the Court reasoned, because of what the test allowed property owners to plead under the Fifth
Amendment and because of what it required courts to do as part of their review of the property
owners’ claims. Having incorrectly articulated the test in the disjunctive as two distinct
inquiries—that is, a plaintiff could plead under either the “substantially advances” or the denial
of an economically viable use test—Agins allowed a property owner to allege that a regulatory
act effects a taking solely on the basis of the character of the government’s action, and without
reference to whether the act had any economic effect on the use of his land.47 Furthermore, the
“substantially advances” test, especially as applied without reference to the regulation’s effect on
the owner’s property, invited courts to scrutinize the purpose, wisdom, and functionality of a
regulatory act in an open-ended and potentially rigorous way.48
The Agins test thus fundamentally mistook the nature and purpose of the Takings Clause,
Lingle held, and, in the process, made three fundamental errors. The first error was categorical.
Judicial review of a government act’s functionality and wisdom belongs within a substantive
Due Process test rather than a takings test.49 The second error was procedural: the test focused
on the wrong details and as a result mistook the Takings Clause’s normative purpose. A
complaint alleging that a regulation fails to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest
sheds no light on the key issues of takings analysis, which are “the magnitude or character of the
burden a particular regulation imposes upon property owners” and how such burden “is
distributed among property owners.”50 A property owner’s takings claim must identify the
property owner’s loss and individualized burden rather than of the government’s mistake. Third,
the test misconceptualized the role of judicial review because it “would empower—and might
often require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and
expert agencies.”51 The “substantially advances” test thus miscasts the court as a superlegislature, able to second-guess and overrule the decisions of elected officials. As a result of
45
See John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest
Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1328-33 (1989); Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The
Genealogy and Operations of the Agins Tests, 33 URB. LAW. 343 (2001). But see R. S. Radford, Of Course a Land
Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15
ENVTL. L. REV. 353 (2004).
46
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078.
47
Id. at 2083-84.
48
Id. at 2085-86.
49
Id. at 2083-84. This confusion, the Court conceded, extended beyond Agins, and the Court only began to
correct it in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985),
when it disentangled the origins of regulatory takings and declared it to be in the Takings Clause rather than in
substantive due process. See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2983 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197-99).
50
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2084.
51
Id. at 2085.
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applying the wrong substantive legal standard, which forces courts to scrutinize the cause and
mechanism of the regulatory act rather than its effects, the Agins test “has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence.”52
This conclusion assumes, of course, that there is a singular takings jurisprudence out of
which the Agins test could be cast—a contested proposition, to say the least.53 By sorting and
reasonably elaborating history, doctrine, and normative justification appears, the Court
confidently stated that a coherent regulatory takings jurisprudence indeed exists, and cast Lingle
as an ending—the end, ultimately, of the complicated common law development of regulatory
takings, at least as a major jurisprudential and political undertaking. It presented this coherence
in two ways: as an unbroken historical narrative of doctrinal development, and as a singular,
cohesive doctrine.
This historical narrative looks substantially as follows. No regulatory takings doctrine
existed until Mahon, when Justice Holmes articulated his “storied but cryptic formulation”
therein that a regulation that “‘goes too far’” effects a taking.54 “Beginning with Mahon,” a
limited regulatory takings doctrine emerged, requiring compensation in those rare instances
when a regulation is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or
ouster.”55 Penn Central forms the key precedent for the regulatory takings doctrine and the
default standard for the judicial review of takings claims,56 and the categorical exceptions to
Penn Central, which identify particular regulatory acts as constituting per se takings are outlying
instances, mere exceptions that prove the centrality of the Penn Central test. Viewed in
retrospect within the trajectory of this narrative, the decisions establishing the respective
categories, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 57 (total diminution in value) and Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.58 (physical invasion), and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission59 and Dolan v. City of Tigard60 (individualized development conditions that require
dedication of land), did not signal a radical departure from judicial deference—or, as we can now
see from Lingle’s sweeping narrative, from the grand progression established by Penn Central
and continued over the next three decades to the present.61 Lingle thus appeared to reject any
52

Id. at 2087.
Lingle was not itself a radical departure from recent decisions; in fact, it echoed and cited similar
statements by six justices in Tahoe-Sierra. See 535 U.S. at 323-27. But unlike Tahoe-Sierra, Lingle was the rare
takings case that attracted every justice.
54
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
55
Id.
56
See id. at 2082 (characterizing the Penn Central factors as “the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory
takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central
itself. . . .”); see also Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23 (quoting “polestar” statement from Palazzolo concurrence).
57
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
59
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
60
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
61
Significantly, Justice Scalia’s decision in Lucas, seen generally as an effort to depart from the Penn Central
narrative, itself helped solidify it. Lucas first conceded that the regulatory takings doctrine was a modern invention
established first in Mahon as an effort to curb government overreach and protect private property. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1014. What began as an effort to naturalize the Lucas holding that a regulation depriving a property owner
of all economic value effects a taking unless the government can identify “background principles of nuisance and
53
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more expansive vision of the normative purpose for the Takings Clause’s application to
regulatory takings beyond compensating property owners for exceptionally burdensome
regulation. Although this conclusion was foreshadowed in both Palazzolo v. Rhode Island62 and
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,63 the unanimous
decision in Lingle appears to provide a stronger sense of closure.
The cohesive doctrine looks substantially as follows. Presented with a regulatory act
whose effects fall within certain enumerated categories that represent “functional equivalences”
to the “paradigmatic taking” of eminent domain for which compensation is always required, a
court must apply heightened scrutiny.64 These categories, which include permanent physical
invasions, complete diminutions in value, and regulatory conditions imposing permanent
physical invasions, are narrow and finite in number. But presented with regulatory acts whose
effects fall outside of these categories, courts must apply a deferential balancing test.65 Because
it must look only to regulatory effects, a court adjudicating a takings claim does not consider
what the “substantially advances” test requires: judicial review of a regulation in isolation from
consideration of its effects on property and the rights of ownership, and rigorous scrutiny of a
regulatory act’s wisdom and effects.66 Using Lingle as the occasion to strike the “substantially
advances” test, then, the Court clarified, solidified, and narrowed its regulatory takings doctrine.
Indeed, Lingle reads not unlike the final chapter of a mystery novel in which the detective
reveals all of the clues that led to the crime’s solution and faces no contradiction from any of the
other characters—including the police commissioner who doggedly pursued a different theory of
the crime.67 To resolve the viability of the Agins two-part test, the majority castAgins ’
disjunctive test out of the takings narrative by parsing the doctrine’s progression and cleaning up
some loose ends. Thus, earlier decisions that either confused the Due Process and Takings
Clauses, or that imported due process concepts into the adjudication of a takings claim ceased to

property law” that restrict the owner’s use of the property, see id. at 1026-32, ultimately became in Lingle a
contained, rarely invoked application of the nuisance exception to a compensation requirement.
62
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
63
535 U.S. 302 (2002). See Laura Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice , 21 CONST. COMMENTARY ___ (forthcoming, 2005)(manuscript at 6-10, on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=820266.
64
Id. at 2081.
65
Id. at 2081-82.
66
Id. In a brief solo concurrence, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that a regulation like that
challenged in Lingle might be “so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process” rather than the Takings Clause.
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
67
Here, the dogged police commissioner is played by property rights advocates who clung to the
“substantially advance” test as evidence that a different, more expansive Takings Clause still existed and awaited
exhumation. See, e.g., R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails To Substantially Advance
Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 353 (2004) (asserting that
substantial advancement test was a part of the “mainstream” takings doctrine); Larry Salzman, Twenty-Five Years of
the Substantial Advancement Doctrine Applied to Regulatory Takings: From Agins to Lingle v. Chevron, 35 ENVTL.
L. REV. 10481, 10483 (2005) (arguing, prior to the Court’s decision in Lingle, that the Court used the substantial
advance test as a “cause-effect” test of regulations that imposed real constitutional constraints on local governments
while it steered clear of Lochner-style judicial review).
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be takings cases.68 Agins, and its suggestion of judicial scrutiny of a regulation’s wisdom, had
been a red herring. We know that now because finally, after Lingle, we understand regulatory
takings as the doctrine that justifiably and correctly enforces the narrow normative commands of
the Fifth Amendment.
C.
San Remo: The Settled Institutions of Takings Litigation
San Remo v. City of San Francisco also required the Court to consider the implications of
an earlier regulatory takings decision. In its 1985 decision Williamson County Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 69 the Court held that in order to ripen a federal
constitutional takings claim alleging that the application of a regulation required compensation, a
claimant must “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.”70
Courts have read Williamson County as requiring claimants to raise all of their state claims in
state court before their federal takings claims are ripe for adjudication in federal court.71 The
San Remo petitioners, hotel owners forced by the city of San Francisco to pay a high fee to
convert their business from long-term residential rentals to short-term tourist uses,72 strategically
filed and preserved federal constitutional takings claims in order to have those claims heard in a
federal forum rather than in state court.73 Some federal circuits, most prominently the Ninth
Circuit, had previously held that where a takings claim has been litigated first in state court in the
adjudication of takings issues under state law, and state law and federal constitutional law are
coextensive or substantively equivalent, then the federal court is precluded from reconsidering
the issues.74 In the San Remo litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme
Court’s ruling on the property owners’ substantive as-applied claims under state takings law
constituted an “‘equivalent determination’ of such claims under the federal takings clause,” and
thus precluded the lower federal courts from reconsidering the claims under circuit precedent.75
68

See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2083-84 (classifying the early zoning decisions, e.g., Village of Euclid, Ohio v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), as due process
cases, rather than as takings cases, and criticizing language in other decisions that seemed to “commingl[e] . . . due
process and takings inquiries. . . .”).
69
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
70
Id. at 194.
71
See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2501 (assuming Williamson County requires a “final state judgment” before a
federal takings claim becomes ripe in federal court); id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing
that Willamson County requires a claimant to seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings in
federal court, but questioning whether decision was correct). Numerous federal circuits had come to the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 808 (1996); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1093 (1994); National Advertising Co. v. City and County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 413-14 (10th Cir. 1990).
72
San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
73
See id. at 2496-2500 (recounting the litigation’s procedural history).
74
See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998). Not all circuits were in agreement
on this issue. See Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that it would be “both ironic and unfair” if the takings ripeness rule precluded claimants from ever bringing
a Fifth Amendment takings claim).
75
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004).
Petitioners’ facial challenge to the city’s regulations could have been insulated from preclusion because it did not
face the ripeness requirement that their as-applied challenge did under Williamson County. See San Remo, 125 S.
Ct. at 2503 (citing San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998)). Because petitioners raised the facial
issue in state court, however, they did not properly reserve it under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964). See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2503 (discussing San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 106-09 (Cal. 2002)).
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For many property rights advocates and takings plaintiffs’ attorneys, this result unfairly
excludes takings claims from beginning in the lower federal courts.76 Worse, they argue, a
claimant may never have her specific Fifth Amendment takings claim heard if a federal court
finds that state and federal law are coextensive and that the state court adjudication of the state
law takings claim (which was required under Williamson County) was identical to a federal
takings claim.77 Where a property owner is convinced that she cannot get a fair hearing from her
state’s courts and views the federal judiciary as her only opportunity for a fair hearing, the
preclusive effect of a state court determination appears to the property owner to be exceptionally
unjust.78 In their brief before the Court, the San Remo petitioners argued that “‘federal courts
[should be] required to disregard the decision of the state court’ in order to ensure that federal
takings claims can be ‘considered on the merits in . . . federal court.’”79
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision for the entire Court,80 Justice Stevens
characterized the question presented as whether federal courts may “craft an exception” to the
Full Faith and Credit Statute81 for claims brought under the Takings Clause.82 By redrafting the
question,83 Justice Stevens neatly rejected petitioners’ characterization of the issue as one of
righting procedural unfairness. Framing the issue in this manner and responding to it as
reframed, the Court’s decision did not focus specifically on the substantive issue of property
rights; rather, the decision and its reasoning involved judicial comity, efficiency, and a restrained

76

See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There From Here: Supreme
Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671
(2004); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England
Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to
- 43 (2003); Madeline J. Meacham, The Williamson
Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 240
Trap, 32 URB. LAW. 239 (2000); George A. Yuhas, The Ever-Shrinking Scope of Federal Court Takings Litigation,
32 URB. LAW. 465 (2000).
77
See Berger & Kanner, supra note 76, at 687-688; Breemer, supra note 76, at 240; Meacham, supra note 76,
at 241; Yuhas, supra note 76, at 474.
78
See Breemer, supra note 76, at 260-63 (describing California’s procedural and substantive barriers to
receiving compensation under state law).
79
San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8, 14, San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2491 (No. 04340)).
80
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which was joined by three other justices, called for the Court to
reconsider Williamson County’s state litigation requirement, but did not question the majority’s conclusion that state
court takings judgments have a preclusive effect on federal courts where state and federal law are coextensive. See
id. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
81
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Full Faith and Credit Statute provides that “judicial proceedings . . . shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State. . . .” Id. The statute was originally enacted in 1790 as a
Congressional response to Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.” See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
82
San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2495.
83
The Court initially granted certiorari in San Remo on the question of whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings
claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was
rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim.” Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at *i, San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2491 (No. 04-340), 2004 WL 2031862.
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interpretation of legislation,84 while the virtual unavailability of a federal forum raised no
substantive concern. Nothing prevents takings plaintiffs from raising their federal constitutional
claims in state court, the Court reasoned, and state courts are fully capable of adjudicating
federal constitutional claims.85 Plaintiffs can in turn appeal an adverse state court ruling to the
U.S. Supreme Court—a process that existed long before Williamson County, and that was the
route through which Mahon itself began the modern regulatory takings saga.86 If state
adjudication of state law claims also resolves federal constitutional claims, so much the better—
everyone saves the time and money involved in repetitious litigation. Furthermore, because state
courts have more experience at resolving the complex questions that land use disputes raise, their
resolution will likely be more expert and fairer than those of federal courts.87 The Court’s
understanding of the constitutional scheme and its prescription for an optimal system of
adjudication commands that state courts serve as the first, and perhaps only, setting for litigation.
The Court rejected the property owner’s account of Kafkaesque unfairness—my property
has been confiscated and the courthouse door has been slammed shut!—and substituted the
abstract vision of a functional and efficient system of federal governance. Takings litigation must
begin and may end in state court; the courthouse doors are open, but property owners do not get
to choose the one through which they enter and from which they exit; and in any event, the
choice of doors for entrance and exit has no significant effect on outcome. The Court’s account
assumes that state courthouses are at worst interchangeable with federal courts and, at best, are
better suited as institutions to handle the state and local issues implicated in a takings claim. The
adjudication of property disputes, therefore, is subsumed within questions of justiciability,
jurisdiction, and court bureaucracy, and largely ignores the plaintiff’s concerns regarding a fair
hearing.
A concurrence threatened to challenge the system of adjudication the majority upheld.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote separately
to declare that he was not persuaded of the constitutional necessity of Williamson County’s

84

See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2505 (refusing to read an exemption into the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.
§ 1738 (2000), where Congress has not expressed any such intent, and therefore applying “our normal assumption
that the weighty interests in finality and comity” to dismiss petitioners’ claim that they needed access “to an
additional appellate tribunal”).
85
To provide a more detailed explanation, the Court disposed of petitioners’ argument in several ways. First,
the Court held that the reservation of federal claims for adjudication in federal court pending the resolution of state
claims in state court, which the Court expressly allowed in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964), only allowed reservation and reassertion of federal claims in federal court when plaintiffs confined
the scope of the state court’s inquiry to issues of state law. See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2502-03. Because the
petitioners had chosen to broaden the issues reviewed by the state court beyond those of state law, their reservation
of federal takings claims did not fall within England’s parameters. Id. at 2503. Second, the Court noted that it had
“repeatedly held” that plaintiffs can be deprived of the opportunity to litigate claims in federal court if the issues
have already been “actually decided” in state court, even when plaintiffs had been sent to state court in order to ripen
a claim. Id. at 2504-05 (discussing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)). To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would create an exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Statute without Congressional authorization. Id. at 2505-06. Finally, the Court asserted that state courts are
“fully competent” to hear federal constitutional claims arising from local land use decisions and “undoubtedly have
more experience” in resolving such issues. Id. at 2507.
86
Id. at 2506.
87
Id. at 2507.
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litigation requirement (as opposed to its administrative exhaustion requirement).88 The
requirement that property owners exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding in federal
court instead may be merely prudential, Justice Rehnquist suggested, and the Court should
reconsider the expansiveness of Williamson County’s ripeness rule.89 Without directly
challenging the majority’s assertion that state courts could constitute a proper setting for takings
litigation, the concurrence questioned why they would constitute the only setting—a rule that
Williamson County has been read to create and that San Remo acknowledges.90 Conceding that
the Court had previously held that some federal constitutional challenges to state government
action were barred from federal court,91 why, the concurrence asked, must takings claims against
the application of land use regulations be relegated to state court when First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause challenges to land use actions could begin in federal court?92 If speech
and equal protection could trump the majority’s vision of an integrated, seamless system of
constitutional adjudication within a federal system, why not property?
But ultimately, as with Lingle, San Remo appears consistent with precedent in both
doctrine and spirit. The Court in both decisions reaffirmed and appears to have further secured
its narrow approach to regulatory takings for reasons of administrative and bureaucratic
competence, discretion, and efficiency. Unlike Lingle’s surprising unanimity, however, the
concurrence’s invitation to future takings plaintiffs to present the Court with an argument about
Williamson County’s state court litigation requirement in the foreground makes the approach to
takings procedure not quite as secure as Justice Stevens’s opinion appears.
D.
Kelo: Institutional Competency and Public Use
Returning to issues the Court had last confronted two decades before, Kelo concerned the
extent to which the “public use” limitation in the Takings Clause restricts government from using
its eminent domain power to further economic development and raise revenue in an
economically distressed city.93 The petitioners in Kelo were longtime homeowners who
challenged an eminent domain action initiated by the City of New London, Connecticut.94 As
part of an extensive economic development plan, the city hoped to redevelop riverfront property
and adjacent parcels on which Pfizer, a pharmaceutical company, planned to build a global
research facility.95 The development plan called for construction of, among other things, a
hotel/conference center, a technology park, and retail space, all of which would be privately
owned and operated.96 Petitioners’ land was targeted for use as privately operated research and
office space and, more vaguely, as “park support” and perhaps parking lots.97 The city authorized
88

See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2509-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
See id.
90
See id. at 2509.
91
See id. at 2508 (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S 100, 116 (1981)
(holding that taxpayers are “barred by the principle of comity” from asserting constitutional challenges to state tax
systems in federal court)).
92
See id. at 2509 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
93
See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2658.
94
Id. at 2660.
95
See id. at 2658-59.
96
See id. at 2659-60.
97
See id.
89
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the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit, to utilize the city’s eminent
domain power to take whatever property it could not privately purchase in order to assemble land
for the proposed project.98 Among the allegations included in the suit they filed in state court,
the Kelo homeowners claimed that the city’s taking failed to meet the public use requirement of
the federal constitution because it took land from private individuals only to give it, ultimately,
to another private individual for the latter’s private use.99 Overruling a state trial court that had
invalidated under the Fifth Amendment some but not all of the proposed eminent domain
actions, the Connecticut Supreme Court, by a 4-3 margin, upheld all of the city’s proposed
takings for economic development as actions taken “in the public interest” and for a “public
use.”100
Writing for only four other justices, Justice Stevens upheld the city’s actions, based—like
Lingle and San Remo—on the weight of precedent and the institutional settlement and relative
competencies of the political and judicial actors involved in land use regulation and federal
constitutional adjudication under existing precedent. But of the three 2005 takings decisions that
preached obedience to doctrinal stability and concern about the correct role for the federal
constitution and federal courts, Kelo engendered by far the most internal protest and external
criticism, as both Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, and Justice Thomas, writing only for himself, authored vigorous dissents.
The dispute between majority and dissent over precedential authority focused on two
decisions: Berman v. Parker (1954),101 in which the Court upheld the taking of allegedly nonblighted property as part of a larger redevelopment plan;102 and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff (1984),103 in which the Court upheld efforts by a state agency to reform patterns of land
ownership in Hawaii that forcibly transferred fee title from lessors to lessees. A unanimous
decision in Midkiff authoritatively declared that the Court had “long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.”104 Under longsettled law, then, the “public use” limitation would prohibit a “purely private taking” but allow
the use of eminent domain for a “public purpose.”105 The fact that a taking for economic
development purposes leaves the taken property in private hands does not render the taking’s
primary purpose any less public—particularly where, as in Kelo (and Berman), the taking was
part of an authorized, “carefully formulated,” comprehensive plan for redevelopment.106
According to the majority, the Public Use Clause merely sorts eminent domain actions based
upon their purpose, not upon their results or the mechanics of the taking.107
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See id. at 2659.
See id.
See id. at 2660-61 (discussing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 515-21, 527 (Conn. 2004)).
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2665-66 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-35).
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 244.
See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662-64.
Id. at 2664-66.
Id. at 2666.
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The two dissents disagreed, although in different ways and for quite different reasons.108
Justice O’Connor conceded that the takings upheld in Berman and Midkiff had not resulted in
pure public ownership and use of the taken land, but she placed the majority’s decision outside
the limits established in Berman and Midkiff.109 Unlike the blighted property in Berman, or the
oligarchic pattern of property ownership in Midkiff, New London’s eminent domain actions took
land for economic development purposes where the pre-taking land use did not inflict
“affirmative harm on society.”110 Having extended those precedents beyond their limits, the
majority had left “public use” a toothless limit that is now unable to invalidate any eminent
domain actions—even one that would take property from one individual and give it to another
for no public purpose at all.111
Justice Thomas also conceded that binding precedent required an expansive
understanding of public use, but unlike his fellow dissenters, he rejected Berman and Midkiff as
catastrophically mistaken. At the turn of the twentieth century, Justice Thomas argued, the Court
had taken a wrong turn when it replaced the plain meaning of the constitutional text’s Public Use
Clause with an amorphous “public purpose” test.112 Rejecting a premise upon which the modern
interpretation of the Takings Clause relies—that textual meaning, early history, and
contemporaneous commentary are ambiguous and mixed with respect to the meaning of “public
use”113—he recast the modern doctrinal trajectory as the tragic result of judicial acquiescence to
legislative hubris.114 Justice O’Connor’s understanding of the Takings Clause, like the
majority’s, cast the judiciary as a brake on the worst abuses of legitimate government authority;
Justice Thomas, by contrast, viewed the Takings Clause as establishing a firm and broad
constitutional limitation on the taken property’s ultimate use.115 “Purpose” was irrelevant for
Justice Thomas; once the government’s authority is established under relevant federal
constitutional or state law, then the only issue would be the kind of “use” the government
planned for the taken land. If the government or the public “actually uses the taken property,”
then it is constitutionally permissible; anything less, such as land taken for economic
development and given or sold to a private entity, is not.116 Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued
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in favor of an antecedent inquiry into whether the government has the expressly enumerated
power to engage in the proposed eminent domain action at all under the Necessary and Proper
Clause,117 thereby providing for a far more searching review than either the majority or dissent
contemplates.118 For Justice Thomas, Berman and Midkiff should be ignored as “unreasoned”
rather than respected and distinguished or reshaped as precedent.119
But the Kelo majority did not rely solely upon precedent in upholding New London’s
eminent domain actions. It also concluded that legislative authority, institutional competence,
and the Court’s role in a federal system dictated finding the city’s actions permissible—and in so
doing, the Court relied upon concerns similar to those that had proved pivotal in its Lingle and
San Remo decisions. Federal courts owed “respect” both to the legislative determinations of the
state and local governments that authorized and carried out the eminent domain action and to the
state court that upheld them. This respect explains why the Court has neither developed “rigid
formulas” nor engaged in “intrusive scrutiny” to second-guess elected state and local legislative
determinations of the public needs and uses for takings.120 Even if it wanted to develop a formal
rule for “public use,” the majority argued, it would be too difficult to develop a practical,
enforceable test that would both successfully limit the use of condemned property for the benefit
of the general public and sufficiently defer to state and local governments’ efforts to meet the
ever-changing needs of society.121 Relative institutional competence and authority, coupled with
the limits of legal form, dictate judicial deference. Should citizens desire additional limits to
eminent domain authority, the majority counseled, they could petition their state courts and
politically elected legislatures to provide more rigorous judicial review under state constitutions
or eminent domain statutes.122
The dissenters did not share the majority’s concerns about legal process and form. For
Justice O’Connor, “an external, judicial check” on the exercise of eminent domain, “however
limited,” is necessary for the Public Use Clause in the Federal Constitution to have any
meaning.123 She and her three fellow dissenters would find impermissible a “‘purely private
taking’” that would, as in this case, take property that was not inflicting an affirmative harm on
society and give it to another private entity.124 Like the majority, Justice O’Connor’s dissent
would defer greatly to legislative judgments “[b]ecause courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the
efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives.”125 Indeed, her approach would presumably uphold
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takings that result in either public property (even if the pre-condemnation use was non-harmful)
or that result in property formerly used for harmful purposes ending in private hands.126 But for
both dissents, economic development takings produce adverse consequences that require
correction under the Fifth Amendment: government entities captured by wealthy and powerful
interests will take property from the poor and political minorities, resulting in the Motel 6 being
taken for a Ritz-Carlton.127 Immediate and long-term damage to individual property owners and
to the entire institution of private property, according to the dissenters, trumps concern about
such systemic values as federalism and institutional competence.128
*

*

*

The 2005 decisions examined relatively narrow substantive and procedural issues relating
to the regulatory takings doctrine, as well as a fundamental issue regarding the Public Use
clause. Strangely, each decision accomplishes something different from what one might have
expected, given the questions they presented: resolving the narrow substantive regulatory takings
issue prompted the Court to declare a unanimous agreement about the doctrine as a whole;
resolving the procedural regulatory takings issue led the Court to agree unanimously about the
judicial process for adjudicating takings claims, even as it revealed significant unease about that
process; and reaffirming the existing approach to the Public Use clause produced not only a
bitter, broad split among the justices, but also a public outcry against that longstanding approach.
When the Court reviewed the different sets of precedents and reconsidered the particular legal
and systemic questions that these disparate issues raised, it was pulled in different directions.
Each of the three decisions, however, shared an underlying jurisprudential logic regarding the
relative institutional competences operating in land use regulation, a logic that the remainder of
this Article will explicate.
II.

Justifying Takings Law and the Search for Coherence

The case summaries and analysis in Part I signaled this Article’s ultimate argument that
the Court views its takings jurisprudence as an institutional check on the legal processes of land
use regulation. Before the Article explicitly makes that argument in Part III and especially in
Part IV, this Part sorts the prevailing theories that seek to justify either what the Court does, or
what it should do, when it resolves takings claims.
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Such takings theories abound. Some theorists have found coherence in Supreme Court
decisions and either rejoice or fret over what they discover.129 Sometimes their lamentations
subside a decade or more later;130 sometimes the reverse occurs and their once-triumphant tones
turn frustrated and despondent.131 Others, having searched for coherence, claim to have found
nothing and would impose something better.132 Still others are strangely satisfied with the
muddle of it all, finding in doctrinal vagueness and incoherence a recognition of property’s
inherent social and communitarian nature;133 or they declare this incoherence to be a symptom of
the impossibility of resolving the intractable theoretical and political disputes that constitutional
limits on the regulation of property raise.134 But each offers some underlying justification for its
normative vision of takings jurisprudence.
This Part is in some ways a compendium of frustration, a snapshot of the intellectual
spirit that attempts, against all odds, to make sense of takings as constitutional text and common
law, and as a judicial check on regulatory overreach. Although I concede that my tendency is to
appreciate the muddle and find fault in rigid coherence—if only for its consequences, both
anticipated and unanticipated—I have no axe to grind in this Part.135 Nor is my argument that
the search to incorporate and apply some external normative theory from another discipline to
the issue of constitutional property rights is an irrelevant, irresponsible, or illegitimate move for
legal academics.136 My purpose instead is two-fold: first to summarize and explain the most
significant efforts to justify a particular approach to takings, and then to note how the Court has
either rejected, ignored, or invoked without conviction every coherent approach or theory that
commentators have brought to bear on the issues. This part is organized around the three
dominant rubrics for understanding takings law: fairness, utilitarianism, and the validation and
protection of property as a social and legal institution.
A.

Fairness Rationales
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“Fairness”—which, along with utilitarian approaches, is the most generally accepted
rationale for constitutional property rights protections137—appears in takings decisions and
commentary in three guises. In the Court’s most oft-cited rationale for its takings doctrines,
fairness and justice serve as abstract principles that guide, but do not mandate or direct, legal
rules. In the second, which is more of a prominent rationale among commentators than in the
Court’s decisions, the Takings Clause’s fairness rationale serves to protect a victim of a failed
political process that has left her vulnerable to exploitation by a majoritarian decision. And in
the third, which some academic commentators propose, and which the popular protest against
Kelo illustrates, fairness serves to validate popular or vernacular conceptions of property rights
by protecting the expectations and norms of ordinary observers.
1.
Doctrinal Fairness: General Principles of Fairness and Justice
The concept of fairness in takings jurisprudence—which, the Court has stated, emanates
from the Fifth Amendment itself—serves as the most significant and oft-cited justification for
constitutional property rights protection. The so-called “Armstrong principle,” which holds that
the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”138 sets out a
basic fairness rationale that helps explain the regulatory takings doctrine.139 The Court has also
characterized the Takings Clause’s defense against unjust state action as protection from
excessively intrusive regulation that “goes too far”140 or that, in its effects, lacks proportionality
to the public’s needs.141 Unsurprisingly, the Court cited the Armstrong principle explicitly in
Lingle, explaining that the principle’s conception of fairness serves a more fundamental role in
Takings Clause jurisprudence than the “various justifications” that scholars have also attributed
to regulatory takings.142
An analogous understanding of fairness also animates constitutional limitations on
eminent domain. The “just compensation” clause requires that the property owner be made
whole to compensate fairly for her loss. The “public use” clause, as restated in the Calder v. Bull
principle, invalidates the taking of property from one individual merely to give it to another.143
By favoring one individual over another, the state imposes a severe burden on the less favored
without any apparent legitimate purpose. Accordingly, the state’s action is void, as the Court
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restated as recently as 1984.144 Again, the fairness principle is so essential to the Court’s
understanding of the Takings Clause that the Kelo majority itself invoked the Calder principle,
despite ruling against plaintiffs when the government defendant planned to transfer their taken
land to a private entity.145 And the Armstrong and Calder fairness principles are
interchangeable, as Justice O’Connor’s Kelo dissent made explicit.146
But the invocation of principles may be less meaningful than it appears. Granted, the
2005 decisions cited fairness as a justification for their results and for the doctrines they follow
and establish. But, as in earlier decisions, they did so more ritualistically than materially. Most
significantly, they failed to develop analytical or operational tools that would allow any of these
fairness principles to matter.
Kelo is most striking in this regard. For the Kelo dissenters, nothing could eclipse the
manifest unfairness of the state’s actions, which in this case led government agencies to force the
transfer of petitioners’ homes and parcels simply because their current residential uses were
deemed insufficiently advantageous to New London’s coffers.147 Because of the Court’s
willfully blind deference, the dissenters argued, government agencies can now simply take from
those with fewer resources and give to those with more.148 If the Court’s invocation of abstract
fairness principles actually drove their decision, Kelo would have established stricter
enforcement of the Calder principle in order to protect against a state actor’s injustice to
individual property owners—at least as the dissenters viewed both the principle and the facts in
Kelo.149
But the majority found the dissenters’ fairness concerns irrelevant. After citing Calder,
the majority decision immediately declared that the judgments of the state court and the state’s
political branches were legitimate, and explained that the Court had long ago abandoned a strict
“used by the public” requirement in “public use” doctrine in favor of one that allows a taking for
a public purpose.150 The Court’s focus shifted, in other words, from concern for the treatment of
the particular property owner to a generalized, deferential analysis of the property’s ultimate,
post-taking use. Nor was the Court willing or able to consider any injustice in the compensation
offered to the Kelo property owners (and to others whose property is taken for economic
development)151—an issue that raises the question of whether economic development takings are
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especially unfair, given the allegedly profitable uses to which the taken property will be put.152
Fairness in the abstract may well be one of the Court’s considerations when it reviews eminent
domain actions under the Fifth Amendment, but the fairness principle is clearly overshadowed as
a significant rationale by other concerns.
The same holds true for the Court’s tendency to provide quick, relatively facile analyses
of alleged regulatory injustices. Modern regulatory takings decisions appear to oscillate in their
fairness considerations: when it finds that a regulatory taking has occurred, the Court tends to
rely upon a narrow conception of fairness to the property owner and largely ignores the state’s
interest in regulating a proposed use; but when it rejects a regulatory takings claim, the Court
largely ignores any marginal unfairness that a property owner has suffered.153 Consider the
restatements of regulatory takings substance and procedure offered in Lingle and San Remo.
Lingle offers a logic in which property owners are likely to be compensated for a taking if the
regulation’s effects fall within particular categories because the Court assumes that those types
of effects represent per se unfairness—no matter the extent of the injustice and no matter the
unfairness to others of allowing the property owner compensation. If a regulatory action falls
outside of those categories, however, the Court’s logic leaves property owners with little chance
of winning—no matter the extent of the injustice they suffer and no matter the benefits that
others receive from the regulation. Again, as in Kelo, the Court’s other concerns supersede any
worry the Court might have regarding the particular individualized unfairness that the property
owner claims to have experienced.
a government entity rescinds a regulatory act that has effected a taking, see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23at
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The Court relied upon quite similar logic in upholding the procedural scheme under
review in San Remo. In a decision that reached the opposite conclusion from the Ninth Circuit’s
decision that the Court upheld in San Remo, the Second Circuit characterized the effect of
barring consideration of federal constitutional claims in federal court under the Full Faith and
Credit Act as “unfair.”154 Although it did not expressly reject the assertion that this would be
“unfair,” the Court’s series of responses—that neither the Constitution nor Congress has
compelled access to federal court for federal constitutional claims, and that facial takings claims
have no ripeness requirements and can therefore be filed initially in federal court—failed to
consider the appearance of unfairness, especially for litigants convinced that their state court
system undervalues and under-protects property rights.155 Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, by
contrast, characterized the results of Williamson County’s ripeness requirements and the Full
Faith and Credit Act as “dramatic,” especially when seen in comparison to First Amendment and
equal protection challenges to local land use decisions, which face no ripeness requirements and
can be litigated initially in federal court. Thus, Justice Rehnquist and three other justices
signaled their willingness to reconsider what they perceived to be an unfair system of
adjudication.156 For the majority, however, logical systems of judicial review serve as proxies
for fairness; the sense of fairness articulated so eloquently in the Armstrong principle itself plays
little role in the workings of these systems.
2.
Fairness in the Political Process: Protection Against Democratic Excess
A more precise understanding of fairness, and one that offers a somewhat more
discernible approach to judicial review, attempts to identify when a failure in the political
process has left an individual or an identifiable group victim to the “democratic excess” of a
political majority.157 Compensation is due under the Takings Clause, in this view, when the
government takes property from the politically vulnerable, or from an individual or a small group
of people, and in so doing either violates its norm of providing compensation in similar
circumstances or chooses which property to take based on the identity of the particular
landowner.158 Precisely when, and on whose behalf, courts should intervene is a subject of
significant debate among political process theorists—a debate which itself illustrates the theory’s
relative indeterminacy. One cannot tell in advance either which types of individuals or groups
need greater protection, which levels (federal, state, or local) or branches (executive, legislative,
or judicial) of government are most likely to fail to protect the politically vulnerable, or who in a
particular instance was exploited because she was politically vulnerable.159
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Both the Armstrong and Calder v. Bull principles certainly focus on the relationship
between the state’s treatment of the property owner and of others, and implicit in both is the
concern that the property owner has suffered as a result of her unequal access to an unfair or
undemocratic political process. Indeed, Lingle’s summary of the doctrine’s logic explained that
part of the Court’s concern in its categorical takings rules is to protect against the “unique
burden” that particular types of regulatory effects impose upon their victims.160 The Court
appeared to assume that when regulatory effects are dramatic—resulting in permanent physical
invasions and total diminutions in property value—then the democratic process has unfairly
treated the individuals by taking significant property rights from them.161 In other words, the
Court appears to view its functional equivalence categories as a proxy for instances of political
process failure.162
But in rejecting the Agins test, Lingle demonstrated that the Court’s focus is not on
checking, or even considering, the specific political process that results in particular regulatory
action, but is instead on the actual effects of the regulatory action itself.163 What the government
did and how and why the government did it are not the key questions that courts are to ask of
regulations challenged under the Takings Clause. Rather, as Lingle made clear, courts should
consider only the impact the government’s actions have had on the property owner. Clear, actual
failures in the political process are more appropriately considered under the Equal Protection
Clause, where evidence of the process by which individuals are excluded and singled out is far
more relevant,164 while irrational regulatory actions are considered under a substantive due
process analysis.165 The process itself is not the subject of takings claims.
Furthermore, the “functional equivalence” to confiscation that Lingle made plain is the
“common touchstone” of regulatory takings doctrine is both over- and under-inclusive as a proxy
for political process failure.166 Not all total diminutions in value, for example, fall on the
politically vulnerable and voiceless—as the Lucas decision, which concerned regulation that
affected expensive beachfront property owners and a plaintiff who had been a successful land
developer, illustrates.167 Indeed, the Court’s rendering of the facts in its Nollan, Dolan, and
Loretto decisions, which concerned plaintiffs who owned beachfront property168 and property
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used for commercial gain,169 do not classify the plaintiffs as members of the Takings Clause
version of discrete, insular minorities.170 Although the Court never identified a particularly
egregious process failure in local political institutions, it established rules in each decision that
virtually assured that the plaintiffs would win a judgment awarding compensation.
Political process theory also fails to capture the results in cases that fall outside the
narrow categories of heightened scrutiny, where plaintiffs usually lose. These decisions rarely
consider whether the property owners have suffered from significant frustrations with the
political process or were singled out for a special burden. Why has the political process failed
when an owner loses the full value of her home, even if she is wealthy and powerful enough to
seek political voice in the state and local democratic process, but not when she loses, say, 95% of
the value or some other percentage that approaches, but does not meet, the 100% threshold?171
Even more clearly, political process theory cannot explain Kelo or San Remo. The Court
demonstrated no more than a cursory concern with the administrative process that led to New
London’s decision to exercise its eminent domain authority over the Kelo plaintiffs’ property; as
a result, the majority concluded that the economic development plan’s careful formulation
deserved deference.172 That the formulation was careful may speak to the needs for economic
development and the rationality of the plan itself, but it ignores whether the affected
homeowners were singled out or lacked sufficient voice to participate in that formulation. And if
the Court was truly concerned about the possibility of local and state institutions exploiting
individual property owners, then it would surely allow regulatory takings plaintiffs to preserve
their federal constitutional claims for federal courts—a step the Court refused to take in San
Remo.
3.
Fairness in the Vernacular: Social Norms as a Constitutional Baseline
While the Court repeatedly finds an abstract call for fairness in the Fifth Amendment and
has expressed it in the generalities of the compensation requirement and the Armstrong and
Calder v. Bull principles, it has failed to provide any precise limiting factor or test. But doctrine
does not exhaust the relationship between property and fairness in the vernacular expression of
property rights by non-lawyers, as the popular response to Kelo demonstrates. The largely
inchoate public distaste for a Constitution that would allow a city to take someone’s property for
economic development is a popular, as opposed to doctrinal or theoretical, understanding of
constitutional rights, or what Bruce Ackerman famously called an “ordinary observer’s”
understanding of widely held social expectations and disputed legal rules.173 This non-technical,
169
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non-textual vision of fairness offers a set of possible constitutional baselines that would fill in the
gaps the Court has left in its open-ended, venerable fairness principles.
This baseline arises out of what Carol Rose has identified as the norms and narration that
underlie ordinary conceptions of ownership.174 In vernacular expressions of ownership, property
is more than simply a relationship with the thing that is owned, or a relationship with others in
relation to the owned thing—it is also experienced and understood as a narrative, and part of a
broader narrative of the self and its relationship to a broader community.175 When property is
confiscated by the state, or its value is diminished by state action, the property owner’s claims
naturally slip into a narrative structure, one that often features an amorphous but compelling
claim that the state has violated her constitutional property rights. Consider, for example, the
following tales:
I purchased this coastal property with the intent to build my beachfront dream house, and
now the state won’t let me build anything and the property is worthless.176
This house has been in my family for over 100 years; I was born here, as were my
children; my son lives next door with his family in a house that he received as a wedding
gift; and now the city wants to take my family’s houses and give them to a large
corporation which will tear them down.177
Innocent of wrongdoing, surprised by a heartless government’s action, and threatened with the
loss of cherished property, the owner appears as an exceptionally sympathetic victim whose
woeful tale creates a sense of demoralization in those who hear it.178 No one’s property is safe
when one person’s property is taken in a way that violates the norms of government behavior.
These are powerful, persuasive narratives, and takings plaintiffs’ attorneys and property rights
activists have utilized the ability of the well-told takings story to advance their legal and political
cause.179
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Common to these narratives is the implicit outrage at the idea that an individual who
owns property and makes normal use of it can have her ownership and future expectations
disrupted by an unforeseen regulatory or eminent domain action. A baseline of constitutional
rights from the ordinary observer’s perspective must therefore protect an owner’s expectations in
both her affective investment in a narrative of ownership and use, and in her financial investment
in the fungible value of her property.180 This baseline would also require that the owner’s use of
her property be consistent with the norms of community behavior and would not cause harm to
others. Her property may only be subject to confiscation if the community’s needs are great and
the community has no other alternative but to take the owner’s land.181 A vernacular fairness
rule, then, would protect an owner’s normal expected use of her land if it is reasonably similar to
and congruent with the uses to which fellow community members put their land.182
But the Court has not adopted either an ordinary observer’s perspective or a community
norm baseline as a general approach to takings. In Tahoe-Sierra, for example, the majority
explicitly rejected the dissent’s effort to consider a temporary moratorium from the landowner’s
point of view, asserting that such a perspective would find every restriction on use to be a taking
for which compensation is due.183 The narrow regulatory takings categories do appear to
consider both the perspective and the baseline: the physical invasion and the total diminution in
value tests certainly have the value of simplicity, and the decisions that established each test
dwell on the extent and severity of the regulatory effect owners experience in relation to other
property owners.184 As Lingle declared, however, these categories are quite narrow; and outside
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of them, the perspective of the ordinary owner or observer and a community norm baseline
appear to be irrelevant. Only an actual permanent invasion, or a total diminution in value and
use, or a condition on development that requires the dedication of land, enjoy the stringent
protection provided by what appears to be the conception of vernacular fairness incorporated
within the relevant category. Whereas an ordinary observer would likely see a 90% diminution
as warranting compensation as a rule, the Court does not.185 Thus Lingle’s restatement of the
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, with its default balancing test and exceptional, categorical
rules, seems to be the product not of the ordinary observer but of what Ackerman called the
“scientific policymaker” who “manipulates technical legal concepts” to illuminate the
relationship between legal rules and a self-consistent set of larger principles.186
Kelo similarly rejected a popular, community-norm-based conception. Justice O’Connor
began her dissent in Kelo by telling the story of the displaced property owners from their
perspective. She also emphasized that the Kelo plaintiffs did not use their property in such a way
that it caused harm to others, unlike the blighted property in Berman and the oligopolistic land
trusts in Midkiff.187 The majority, by contrast, began its narrative of the facts by focusing on the
conditions of New London and on the city’s decision-making process,188 and by asserting that
the condition of the plaintiffs’ property was irrelevant in the face of precedent, as well as the
judgments of state and local legislators and the state supreme court.189
Perhaps the Court’s mere invocation of a vernacular fairness is a recognition that
ordinary observation could not help formulate a workable federal constitutional test, and an
acknowledgement that this perspective begs as many questions as it resolves. Whose fairness
would be at stake if a Court accepts on its face, and attempts to apply, an ordinary observer’s
sense of fairness? Whose narrative counts—the property owner’s claim that her property has
been unfairly taken, or claims brought by neighbors and the general public alleging that the
property owner’s expectations should not have included protection against regulation or a
necessary eminent domain action? The claims of both owner and community proliferate in a
regulatory state where local, state, and federal authorities react to real and perceived
environmental and social impacts from land use, and where courts serve as a final means for an
individual property owner to challenge majoritarian decisions. And these claims or narratives
themselves produce a proliferation of counter-claims and -narratives from government officials
and other members of the community who both assert the need for regulation and condemn the
property owner’s present or proposed use of her land. Providing compensation to property
owners who consider themselves unfairly treated will not resolve the conflicts in competing
development where the property owner merely sought to build a house that would be consistent with “normal”
California beachfront housing, applied a community norm baseline).
185
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vernacular accounts of unfairness. Fairness, in either its doctrinal or vernacular form, has not
provided, and indeed may be unable to provide, a stable and coherent approach to takings.
B.
Utilitarian Rationales
Utilitarian rationales for the Takings Clause consider how judicial enforcement of the
Fifth Amendment can produce the private property regime that will best meet the proponent’s
stated or unstated normative assumptions regarding how to maximize a society’s wealth.190
Libertarian utilitarians view a compensation requirement for regulation and limitations on
eminent domain as means to limit inefficient government interference in the optimal private
ordering of land use and ownership;191 others utilize constitutional limits to tease out optimal
means to check, rather than debilitate, local government.192 Whether deeply skeptical or agnostic
about government’s role, however, all utilitarians view the Takings Clause as an instrument of
governance, a means by which the political decisions of regulators and agencies that wield
eminent domain authority can be externally controlled by judicial review.
A common assumption among utilitarians who view the Takings Clause as a significant
tool for wealth creation holds that strong, strictly enforced property rights both clarify and secure
ownership and the extent of property’s allowed use, and thereby induce labor and investment.193
Utilitarian rationales rely on political economic theories of government behavior to identify the
structural defects of state decision-making and operations that cause ineffective regulations and
excessive exercises of eminent domain authority. Police power authority, for example, provides
government with strong incentives to avoid taking title to property and compensating the owner.
Because a government agency can thereby shift regulatory costs onto property owners, a rational
agency would never choose to take land and incur the constitutionally-required payment of
compensation. Government experiences the “fiscal illusion” that its regulations are inexpensive
because property owners, rather than the state, bear the regulatory costs.194 Thus, government
would always choose to regulate rather than use its eminent domain power when it can substitute
regulation for outright takings, no matter if the taking would result in a “better,” more wealth
maximizing outcome than the regulation.195 In order to act efficiently, the government agency
must fully internalize the costs of regulation through the “price” of compensation paid to
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property owners. For utilitarians, the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement solves the
fiscal illusion problem by forcing government to consider fully the impact of its decisions.196
Of course, merely finding a rationale for a compensation requirement does not identify
precisely when and to what extent the requirement should be enforced against regulations. To
address this problem, utilitarian commentators have offered various tests to sniff out inefficient
government interventions into market activity and with an eye to imposing rules that would
result in more effective and fairly administered regulatory programs that better protect property
rights and encourage the best usage of land.197
The same political economic dynamic that leads government to over-regulate and that
therefore requires a limiting constitutional compensation requirement, utilitarians argue, also
leads government agencies to misuse or abuse their eminent domain authority and requires
analogous constitutional limits. If frustrated by economic development within their jurisdiction
or otherwise motivated to change existing patterns of land ownership and use, local officials can
too quickly and cheaply take land and as a result will tend to do so excessively and frequently for
the benefit of favored or powerful interests. Judicial enforcement of the “public use” and “just
compensation” clauses can serve as external checks that force such takings to be productive and
wealth-enhancing.198 Strict limits on the public use of land would limit the objectives of eminent
domain actions to the creation of public goods that are insufficiently supplied in the
marketplace,199 or, in a less restrictive view, to instances in which the benefits of the taking
outweigh the costs.200 In addition, a constitutional requirement that would correctly calibrate the
just compensation owed to property owners would force government to disgorge excess gains
from “naked transfers” of property from one party to another, and to increase compensation to
former owners for their loss of implicit, in-kind benefits of the property they lose.201 A correctly
196
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calibrated compensation scheme, therefore, would curb government overreach while it would
more fully compensate owners of taken property.
For some utilitarians, these constitutional restrictions and their enforcement must be quite
strict. Those who find governmental overreach abuse to be the norm—rather than the
occasional, correctable result of structural defects in regulatory and taking authority—view
municipal efforts to control land use and ownership merely as opportunities for self-interested
officials and rent-seeking interest groups to use regulatory authority for private gain.202
Democratic politics provide neither sufficient internal constraints on the scope of regulation and
eminent domain actions nor external political constraints on elected leaders. As a result, land use
controls create opportunities for significant corruption and abuse.203 From this perspective, even
correctly calibrated compensation cannot curb both the authority of government agencies to take
land on behalf of a favored interest and the willingness and ability of favored interests and
officials to utilize that authority.204 Only a vigorously enforced public use clause that would
invalidate any taking that did not result in publicly accessible land can serve as an effective
external check on abuse of government authority.205 Similarly, because regulation serves merely
as a means by which rent-seeking private interests and self-motivated officials feather their own
nests, the judiciary must apply the regulatory takings doctrine broadly and enforce it strictly as
an external check on inevitable government overreach.206
The Court’s takings decisions have not entirely ignored utilitarian and public choice
considerations and skepticism about the wealth-enhancing effects of government action. Justice
Holmes began the modern era of regulatory takings by expressing the intuitive public choice
notion that “the natural tendency of human nature” is to extend collective authority; a
constitutional check on regulations that extend “too far,” therefore, operates to preserve the right
of private property and all of its attendant benefits.207 In a more recent decision, Justice Scalia
similarly hypothesized that, absent a constitutional limit, government agencies would leverage
their police powers to achieve unstated, unrelated, and even illegitimate goals through
regulation—which would lead, presumably, to excessive regulation that fails to perform the
regulatory purpose of reducing the harms created by a proposed land use.208
But Justice Holmes’s intuitive version of public choice theory does not represent either a
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utilitarian concerns as a significant ground for enforcing constitutional property rights
protections. Indeed, when the Court has considered the consequences of a compensation
requirement on a regulation or of a substantive limit on an eminent domain action, it has
frequently decided that Takings Clause enforcement is unrelated to, or even opposed to, an
optimal utilitarian end. Thus, in recent years the Court has held that some regulatory activity and
economic development projects can be wealth-enhancing and necessary for the management of
scarce resources—while at the same time curbing regulatory and taking authority through
constitutional enforcement would limit the state’s ability to help increase societal wealth.209 The
Court has hypothesized that stricter enforcement of the Takings Clause may skew governmental
actions and produce suboptimal results by creating incentives for agencies to make decisions in
order to avoid judicial scrutiny rather than basing decisions on the wisest course of action
available to them.210 In other words, the Court has decided that judicial conceptions of a
utilitarian purpose in land use controls are irrelevant, except where the judiciary is considering
the costs of heightened scrutiny to its own administrative utility;211 the wisest, most utilitarian
course of judicial action is to defer to governmental conclusions regarding the utilitarian value of
its own regulatory or eminent domain actions.
It is unclear why the Court has largely eschewed the legal academy’s fascination with,
and development of, a utilitarian analysis of the Takings Clause. The Court may have
determined that a utilitarian approach is too indeterminate to adopt, given the persuasive
arguments that can be harnessed on behalf of and against the utility of government interventions

209

On the potential wealth-enhancing effects of economic development takings, see Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 266263 nn.7, 8; on the wealth-enhancing effects of land use regulations, see Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 339-41
(characterizing a deliberative, careful approach to regional planning that imposes a temporary moratorium on
development during the planning process as an important means to avoid “inefficient and ill-conceived growth” and
is likely to increase property values throughout the affected region). The state frequently must step in to manage the
use of scarce public goods such as clean air, water, park space, and road capacity where the existing distribution of
entitlements to use those resources block beneficial contractual arrangements. See GARY D. LIBECAP,
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 115-21 (1989). There is a significant literature on the necessity of land use
regulations to respond to resource depletion and congestion and on the need to limit a compensation requirement to
allow government to shape market activity to manage transitions. See Poirier, supra note 6, at 179-83; Carol M.
Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 18 (2000). In
addition, land use regulation has proven to have both wealth-enhancing effects and popularity among rational
homeowners who believe, correctly, that land use controls often raise and protect property values. See McUsic supra
note 5, at 625 n.162; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 51-52 (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL,
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS].
210
See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would compensate for
every delay because it “would encourage hasty decision-making”); see also Fenster, supra note 135, at 652-58
(identifying the range of consequences, most of them unintended and suboptimal, stemming from the Court’s efforts
to increase scrutiny of land use exactions); Krier & Serkin, supra note 201, at 864-65 (noting the problems that
would arise from greater scrutiny of eminent domain actions under public use clause); Michael H. Schill,
Regulations and Housing Development: What We Know, 8 CITYSCAPE 5, 6-8 (2005) (cautioning that efforts to
remove land use regulation find it difficult to distinguish “bad” from “good” regulations).
211
The Court has cited the potentially catastrophic transactional costs associated with resolving or settling
regulatory takings claims, as well as the decisional costs to the judiciary of administering stricter limits on the public
use clause. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would compensate for every delay because it
“would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive”); Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662 (expressing concern
about the difficulty of heightened judicial review under the public use clause).

32

into market activity.212 A court could follow Richard Epstein and conclude that only an
expansive regulatory takings doctrine and a narrow public use clause can adequately maximize
wealth; or it could follow Carol Rose and conclude that the best wealth-maximizing approach to
takings would be to form a doctrinal compromise in which regulation proceeds flexibly and
cautiously, and only those whose investment-backed expectations are severely frustrated receive
compensation;213 or it could recognize that any effort to maximize the utility of constitutional
limits on land use controls requires a multi-dimensional analysis that considers an almost
unlimited range of concerns, from “takings” to “givings,” and from the effects of compensation
requirements on the public and on indirectly affected property owners.214 Neither text nor
history nor precedent dictates a choice between those two options. Perhaps, too, the Court has
recognized the validity of critiques of utilitarian approaches,215 or the inadequately theorized
concepts on which utilitarians rely to promote vigorous takings enforcement, such as the fiscal
illusion of regulation and the cost internalization effect of compensation requirements.216 It is
also possible that the utilitarian approach is not as distinct from others as it might superficially
appear, and that an approach emphasizing fairness and one that emphasizes a utilitarian ethic will
frequently turn on similar considerations and measures, as Frank Michelman argued more than a
generation ago.217 Viewed this way, the court has not rejected utilitarianism but merely
incorporates its insights within other rationales. But significantly, the court did not rely upon a
utilitarian rationale as a basis for its 2005 decisions.
C.

Private Property as an Institution

212

See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 134 (2004) (noting economic
arguments both for and against providing compensation for regulatory takings); DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at
27-32 (noting utilitarian arguments in favor of eminent domain authority, as well as reasons for limiting that
authority).
213
See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 19-21.
214
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (identifying the underutilization by the public of rare and valuable resources due to
excessive constitutional rights that over-protect property); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111
YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (identifying “givings,” in which a government promulgates a regulation that grants benefits to,
rather than confiscates the property of, an identifiable individual or individuals); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (2001) (identifying the “derivative taking” that
results from the reduction in the value of property near a parcel that is taken by regulation or eminent domain).
215
For example, a moral hazard problem would arise from an expanded compensation requirement, which will
encourage owners to overdevelop and over-invest in their property with the knowledge that any regulatory act that
addresses an owner’s use of her land will be compensated. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 614-17 (1986). Commentators have devised solutions to this moral hazard. See
Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 48 (2003) (proposing a compensation
scheme that would bar recovery for a property owner’s reckless overdevelopment); Lawrence Blume et al., The
Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71, 88 (1984) (proposing that compensation
only be paid for amount approximating full value of property without overdevelopment).
216
See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Public Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
245, 289 (2002) (summarizing empirical evidence and theoretical arguments against assumptions embedded in fiscal
illusion concept); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 387 (2000) (arguing that cost internalization theory of compensation
requirement fails because the incentive effects of constitutional cost remedies are “simply indeterminate,” and is
likely to be as perverse as beneficial).
217
See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 137, at 1225-26.

33

A final general justification for enforcement of the Takings Clause holds that
constitutional compensation and public use requirements are necessary to protect property rights
as an essential institution for the maintenance of natural law and of social order and community.
Since its earliest modern occurrence in Mahon, for example, the Court’s regulatory takings
doctrine has frequently warned that, if the state is allowed to extend its police powers too far, use
of these powers will expand “until at last private property disappears.”218 This justification is not
primarily utilitarian insofar as it posits that property’s institutional value transcends any
particular wealth-enhancing effects; nor is it primarily intended to remedy any particularized
unfairness to an individual owner. Rather, this rationale, which includes quite distinct
approaches, views the institution of private property as holding significant value for human
dignity and the creation of a good society.
1.
Property as Natural Right/ Takings Clause as Protective Shield
Natural law (or natural rights) proponents argue that property serves as a pre-legal and
pre-political right that remains inherent in personhood under civil society’s social compact
between the individual and the state.219 Whether viewed as flowing from a Creator or as
developed in human experience and through common law rights, the institution of private
property protects from coercive state action the things over which an individual claims dominion
and for which she expended her labor. Thus, natural rights proponents argue, in order to protect
private property from the inevitable vulnerability that comes with government authority to
redistribute entitlements, courts must interpret the Takings Clause strictly and enforce it
broadly.220 Specifically, courts must award compensation to property owners for the regulatory
prohibition of non-nuisance harms,221 and courts must interpret government’s authority to take
under the public use clause narrowly, and invalidating all eminent domain actions whose end
result will be a private use of the taken land except in narrow, historically recognized
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categories.222 And in order to secure a natural rights conception of private property, courts must
adopt stable, precise, and self-enforcing rules.223
But as Carol Rose has noted, natural law conceptions of a pre-political basis for property
rights have never had more than a “frail” hold on takings jurisprudence.224 The Court has
occasionally feinted in the direction of natural rights in its decisions establishing per se
categories of takings, boldly pronouncing that compensation is required for a particular type of
regulatory effect or for the taking of a particularly significant stick in the bundle of property
rights.225 But to understand property rights as a bundle rather than as a coherent whole, and to
reward some regulatory effects with compensation while allowing other significant effects
without rule-bound, formal protection, is to adopt something that falls significantly short of a
natural law approach.226 The unanimous reiteration of this approach in Lingle further
demonstrated that the Court has rejected a unitary, natural law theory of property in favor of a
theory of property as a disentangled bunch of severable rights. This is not natural law, and
natural rights proponents are the first to admit that even at the heights of the Rehnquist Court’s
apparent expansion of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court did not adopt their view.227 Indeed,
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo, which expressly adopted a natural law approach to property,
failed to garner a single additional justice.228 And although Justice O’Connor included in her
Kelo dissent an ironic reversal of Marx’s opening to The Communist Manifesto—warning that
“the specter of condemnation hangs over all property” as a result of the majority’s decision229—
she would allow a much broader array of takings than Justice Thomas.230
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This may well be the fault of the theory, not the Court. Any effort to limit noncompensable takings to the regulation of nuisance-like harms must not only rely upon a
significantly heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory and takings decisions, it must also
confront the difficult line-drawing issue created by the need to identify the boundaries of
nuisance and public use.231 The natural rights advocate must assert that some line-drawing
principle emerges from the Constitution itself—a principle so clear and strong that it trumps
states’ authority to utilize their police powers and to define the limits of property rights within
their jurisdiction.232 In Lucas, Justice Scalia himself conceded the impossibility of engaging in a
principled line-drawing exercise between regulations that prevent harm, and thus do not require
compensation, and those that confer benefits on others, which do.233 Once one recognizes the
difficulty of line-drawing, property’s occasional tendency towards crystalline rules234 becomes
impossible to extend fully to the Takings Clause—whose enforcement, if considered as a means
to limit non-nuisance based regulation, would inevitably require courts to make difficult
judgments regarding contested land uses on the basis of conditions and norms that change across
time and space.235
2.

Property as Social and Political Institution/ Takings Clause as Mediating
Device
An approach that emphasizes property’s social nature and collective values foregrounds
the relationships that ownership creates and expresses. This approach emphasizes the sense of
responsibility and obligations an owner has to others and to the property she owns, as well as the
mutual trust that a property regime is intended to foster among members of society.236 In
addition to defining the terms ownership and use, the rules of property law establish both the
individual’s place in society and her obligations “to respect the legitimate interests of others in
controlling certain portions of the physical world.”237 Property serves as a foundation of decency,
propriety, and good order. Accordingly, a constitutional property right must operate reciprocally
both to protect an individual’s ownership entitlements and to redistribute those entitlements
when propriety or the community requires it.238
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According to Joseph Singer, the Court has adopted at least a version of this approach in
its 2005 takings decisions.239 The Court, he argues, enforces constitutional rights by balancing a
property-rule right that views ownership as paramount and the home as a “castle,” against a
liability-rule right in which ownership entitles an individual only to full compensation for her
investment-backed expectations when the government takes her property for public needs.240
This balance produces a “citizenship model” of property rights in which owners’ rights to use,
protect, and profit from their home are limited by their obligations, for the good of the
community to which they belong, both to restrain themselves and, at times, to act
affirmatively.241 Thus, the map of regulatory takings claims that Lingle set out recognizes
property as a “castle” when it is besieged by extreme regulatory effects, but otherwise subjects
owners’ expectations “to the crucible of human judgment to determine their reasonableness.”242
This social view of property embraces precisely what natural law proponents fear as an
excess of state intervention into the inherent rights of ownership—the political, communitybased nature of decisions over how land is to be used. In this view, the social and political
processes by which regulations are formulated and enacted are opportunities for successful
dispute resolution and education about the advantages of self-government and the need to be
sociable—rather than an inevitable legal catastrophe in which rights are ignored and trampled.243
Insofar as the Takings Clause largely defers to the local political process but requires
compensation or invalidates eminent domain actions when property rights are especially
diminished or individuals are explicitly singled out, it functions both to protect and mediate. It
encourages, if not forces, property owners to work with their neighbors, safe with the knowledge
that a baseline of constitutional protection will be extended when their efforts result in the
invalid or uncompensated expropriation of their property.
Without going so far as expressly adopting an educational or mediatory rationale for its
decision in Lingle, the Court characterized its takings jurisprudence as an effort to balance
concern for the individual with deference to the community and democratic will. Although
Lingle’s “functional equivalence” doctrine identifies those regulatory instances that are “so
onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster” and thus require
compensation,244 the determination of when a regulation is equivalent to appropriation or ouster
requires a court to “remain cognizant” of the government’s authority to “adjust[] . . . rights for
the public good,” and consequently of the impossible burden government would face if it must
pay compensation for every change in its laws.245 Thus, the categories of per se takings relieve
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the “unique burden” they impose due to their equivalence with appropriation and ouster, while
the Penn Central default test balances fairness concerns with the need to defer to government
attempts to promote the public good.246 Kelo operates similarly, although the majority decision
seemed less concerned about unfairness to the individual’s loss of their property and any
potential shortfalls in compensation.
In this sense, the Court has implicitly, although not as explicitly as Singer appears to
claim, adopted a conception of property rights as both an individual right and as an institution
within which those rights are balanced against the community’s needs, and of the Takings Clause
as a means by which courts mediate this balance. Of the rationales I have reviewed in this Part,
this conception of the Court’s reasons for its 2005 decisions seems best able to capture at least
parts of the decisions’ substantive purpose. In Part III, I begin to identify the Court’s more
explicit institutional rationales in its federalist tendencies before arguing ultimately that legal
process and institutional settlement in fact serve as the approach underlying the Court’s 2005
decisions.
III.

The Incomplete Explanation of Federalist Deference

At stake in most, although not all, takings decisions is how the federal constitution’s Fifth
Amendment applies to the actions of state and local governments. A number of scholars have
persuasively asserted that federalist concerns for state law’s supremacy over property law and
state and local governments’ authority to oversee land use in their jurisdictions either explain or
should play a stronger role in the Court’s takings jurisprudence.247 These arguments assert the
following: States, and not the federal Constitution, generally define property and the rights that
attach to it;248 states, by statute or constitution, authorize local governmental authority to regulate
and take property, and can thereby limit that authority;249 state constitutions include or have been
read to include takings provisions, and state courts are perfectly capable of enforcing both those
provisions and, if need be, federal ones;250 and state legislatures have filled any perceived gaps
246
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and shortcomings in federal and state constitutional compensations requirements by imposing
legislative requirements.251 In light of these structural and institutional commitments, states and
their subordinate agencies are, or should be, granted the autonomy to regulate land use and
ownership within their jurisdictions and without overly intrusive federal constitutional rules
imposed upon them by the U.S. Supreme Court and enforced by the federal judiciary.252
Federalism proponents offer consequentialist claims as well as structural ones, arguing
that deference to state law and state courts offers significant beneficial consequences. State
courts and legislatures are better situated than the Supreme Court to devise either optimal takings
rules that could apply in multiple states, or rules that are narrowly tailored to a state’s specific
needs or legal culture.253 The complex nature and wide variance of state property law advises
against Supreme Court efforts to impose significant, complicated takings rules that would
provide little guidance to state courts and legislatures and local regulators, and that would lead
ultimately to uneven enforcement by state and lower federal courts.254 Deference to lower levels
of government also enables state and local jurisdictions to compete for potential residents with
differentiated package of public goods, tax rates, and regulatory regimes; individuals can then
simulate shoppers in their decisions about where to live to find jurisdictions that offer the most
attractive packages of public goods amenities, property values, and taxes, and can thereby reward
or punish local governments based on their effectiveness.255 So long as some minimal legal
checks are available to require bad-acting local governments to compensate victims of unfairly
outlying regulation, then the market that develops through competitive localism will be more
beneficial to property owners than rigorous federal constitutional protections.256
Federalism therefore appears to be a persuasive explanation of the Court’s takings
jurisprudence—and, indeed, two of the 2005 decisions explicitly noted its influence in their
outcomes. The Kelo majority characterized early twentieth century precedent on public use as
having “embodied a strong theme of federalism” in its respect for the decisions of state
legislatures, and implied that this principle supported its decision.257 The Court in San Remo
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suggested that its decision not to except takings decisions from the Full Faith and Credit Act
relied in part on its “weighty” interest in demonstrating comity towards state court judgments, as
well as on state courts’ experience “in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal
questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.”258
But notwithstanding occasional language to support it, federalism appears either to be a
secondary rationale or a post hoc explanation for takings decisions. When the Court relies upon
federalism at all—which it did not do in Lingle’s unanimous explanation of its regulatory takings
doctrine—it typically raises it as one among a series of rationales.259 Perhaps most significantly,
the conservative justices who have expressed and voted more regularly for limiting the
application of federal constitutional rights to the states, at least with respect to state immunity
from federal statutory claims, 260 are those who have been most vocally opposed to the Court’s
approach to the Takings Clause.261 At the same time, the justices who have opposed the Court’s
expansion of federalism in its state sovereign immunity decisions have also cited federalist
principles and the need to defer to state judgments and legislatures in takings cases.262 Even
granting the sincerity of conservative justices’ commitment to a natural, pre-political right in
property, and of liberal justices’ commitment to the sovereignty of state governments, one cannot
help but conclude that their respective positions in takings cases represent a strategic approach to
federalism that defers to state authority only to the extent that such deference creates a result that
is consistent with other, competing concerns.263
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Second, if federalism were in fact the central rationale for takings law then one would
anticipate different results when the federal government, rather than a state or local government,
is the defendant, or when federal definitions of property rights are under review. This has not
been the case. In United States v. Sperry,264 for example, the Supreme Court applied the same
constitutional tests to a regulatory takings claim as when state or local governments were
defendants,265 while in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,266 the Court applied the same
constitutional tests to a claim seeking invalidation of a federal statute under the Public Use
Clause as when state and local governments were defendants.267 The Court offered no hint that it
considered either its takings jurisprudence or an underlying definition of property to be different
when it considered a federally imposed user fee rather than one imposed by a state
government.268 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit, which under the Tucker Act is the sole forum
that can award just compensation exceeding ten thousand dollars against the United States,269
freely applies Supreme Court decisions that arose out of state court when it adjudicates claims
brought against state and local governments.270
It is true that in two recent decisions on federal statutory redefinitions of property rights,
Hodel v. Irving271 and Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,272 the Court held that the respective property
owners were due compensation for having suffered takings imposed by the federal government.
This relatively rare result might indicate that the Court enforces the Takings Clause more strictly
against the federal government than the states.273 Neither decision, however, indicates that the
fact that the Court was reviewing federal action determined its result. Rather, in Hodel the Court
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held that the challenged statute effected a taking by expropriating, without compensation, an
essential right of property, the right to pass valuable property to one’s heirs.274 The character of
the property right taken, and not the identity of the state actor, was the reason the plaintiff was
owed compensation. Similarly, the four-justice plurality in Eastern Enterprises held that the
challenged statute’s imposition of “severe retroactive liability” on the plaintiffs substantially
interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectation and therefore effected a taking.275
Thus, the character of the government action and the extent of the burden on the property owner
tipped the balance in favor of the property owner, not the identity of the state actor. In recent
decisions, including those from 2005, the Court has not cited Hodel and Eastern Enterprises as
examples of more stringent federal court review of the federal government: the majority in Kelo
and Justice Kennedy in Lingle cited Eastern Enterprises as relevant precedent for considering
actions against state agencies,276 and the Court has repeatedly cited Hodel as relevant outside of
the context of federal government actions.277
In short, the Court invokes federalist principles regularly in its takings decisions, and, at
least during the Rehnquist Court, a majority of justices appeared to be committed to deferring to
state and local government authority over land use controls. But, as Part IV argues, in the 2005
takings decisions federalism operated as part of the Court’s broader, legal process-based
commitment to institutional settlement and competencies.
IV.

Of Institutions and Competencies: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property
Rights

The approaches to takings law discussed in Part II seek to identify both what question
should be asked about the extent of federal constitutional protections against takings and how it
should be answered. The federalist approach discussed in Part III primarily asserts that federal
constitutional law should not dominate the regulation and taking of property, which is largely of
state concern. But none of these approaches frames takings law in the way the Court does in its
2005 decisions. Resolving a broad array of substantive and procedural issues, Kelo, Lingle, and
San Remo provide a vision of structure and process that is consumed with the question of who
should decide which question when—not what should be decided. This Part argues that the
Court’s focus most closely resembles that of the legal process school, and appears to borrow
three of that approach’s core concepts relating to governing institutions and their relative
competencies. Recognizing the role of legal process in substantive constitutional doctrine helps
274
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us to understand the historical dynamic that resulted in the 2005 decisions, offers some
predictive insight into the future of takings law (and especially of the Public Use Clause, if the
Roberts Court decides to revisit the issue and overturn or limit Kelo), and enables better
understanding of the generalized dissatisfaction scholars and the public have with the Court’s
takings jurisprudence.
A.
Legal Process: Institutional Settlement and Competency
The legal process school (or approach) to governance and adjudication came to dominate
legal education and public law scholarship in the post-war period, and today it remains a
pervasive, if not wholly predominant, understanding of the modern regulatory state and
especially of the judiciary’s role within it.278 Five members of the Rehnquist Court—Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom remain on the Roberts Court—were
explicitly introduced to the legal process approach as Harvard law students.279 Its great
expression was in the unpublished casebook “materials” that bore the name The Legal Process,
which were developed by Harvard professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, used in classes at
Harvard, and adopted in mimeographed form for use by the authors’ colleagues and by other
legal academics.280 The approach arose out of a confluence of influences, including Justice
Brandeis’s opinions on the Supreme Court (such as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins281), legal
realism, Felix Frankfurter’s administrative law and federal jurisdiction scholarship and teaching
at Harvard, and, after Brandeis left the Court and Frankfurter joined it, decisions by Justices
Frankfurter, Harlan, and Stone.282
Legal process proceeded from three basic claims. First, law is purposive and
instrumental, and ultimately a means to “solve the basic problems of social living” and to enable
the prosperity and smooth functioning of modern society.283 Second, the “legal process” extends
beyond formal judicial adjudication and statutes, and includes both private ordering (which Hart

278

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Making]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The
New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1991);
Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84
OR. L. REV. 69, 124-27 (2005); Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social
and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 475 (1995); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2005).
279
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction to HART & SACKS,
supra note 11, at cxxv [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction]. See also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1387 (2000) (chief judge of the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
declaring his commitment to legal process approach).
280
On the history of the Hart and Sacks materials, see Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 278, at 203342, and on its adoption by other legal academics, see Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279, at cii-civ.
They were finally published, more as an historical text than as a working casebook, in 1994. HART & SACKS, supra
note 11. As Neil Duxbury has observed, contemporary readers cannot replicate the materials’ role in producing its
main intended effect, the “classroom experience” of legal process. See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process
Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 653 (1993)
281
304 U.S 64 (1938).
282
See EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 223-28 (2000); Eskridge &
Frickey, Introduction, supra note , at liv-lxviii; Fenster, supra note 278, at 124
- 27; Felix Frankfurter & Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935).
283
HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 148.

43

and Sacks described as the “primary process of social adjustment”284) and the modern regulatory
state.285 Third, the processes and structures of the legal process, which compose a “coordinated,
functioning whole made up of a set of interrelated, interacting parts,”286 are “obviously more
fundamental than the substantive arrangements in the structure of society . . . since they are at
once the source of the substantive arrangements and the indispensable means of making them
work effectively.”287 In brief, as both an academic and normative matter, “process,” defined
quite broadly, overshadowed and perhaps even transcended substance.288
Three fundamental concepts and one significant insight from the legal process school are
relevant to current takings jurisprudence, and I will focus here only on them.289 First, the key
legal process concept of “institutional settlement” refers to a society’s development of “duly
established procedures” that are employed by competent institutions to arrive at substantive
decisions that are in turn binding and legitimate as a result of the process by which they are
made.290 These institutional arrangements include the federal system of governance, which,
Henry Hart explained, offers “varied facilities, providing alternative means of working out . . .
solutions of problems which cannot be solved unilaterally.”291 This includes the system of
federal courts292 as well as state laws and institutions.293 The structured relationship among these
various parts, as well as the interrelated and internal procedures utilized to enable this
complicated apparatus to function, constitute the institutional settlement that the legal process
school both privileged and obsessed over.
“Institutional competency,” a second key legal process concept, asserts that a satisfactory
institutional settlement would both assign the kinds of disputes or issues that arise to the
institutions best able to resolve them, and enable institutions to develop and employ the optimal
284

Id. at 159-61.
Id. at 342.
286
Id. at cxxxvii.
287
Id. at 3-4.
288
Gary Peller, “Neutral Principles” in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 569 (1988).
289
The primary literature produced during the heyday of the legal process approach, and the secondary
literature commenting on and chronicling the approach, is vast. For summaries, see Duxbury, supra note 280;
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279. I am only extracting some of the approach’s tenets, although the
ones I discuss are among the most significant.
290
HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 4.
291
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 490 (1954).
292
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).
Federal courts as a subject of academic inquiry was, contemporaneous with the rise of legal process, overtaken by
what has become known as the Hart & Wechsler “paradigm,” so-called because of the casebook edited by legal
process theorists Henry Hart (who was also developing the legal process casebook materials at the same time) and
Herbert Wechsler. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, eds., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation, 1953); Fallon, supra. The Hart and Wechsler approach to federal courts shared with
the legal process school an institutionalist focus, a functionalist approach to governing structures, and a triumphant
celebration of the specific, narrow competencies that the judiciary offer. HART & WECHSLER, supra, at ix-x. Hart
and Wechsler’s institutionalism was more narrowly focused on federalism and the preservation of spheres of state
sovereign autonomy as opposed to legal process’s broader consideration of decision-making institutions, while Hart
and Wechsler’s functionalism focused on the separation of federal powers, while, again, legal process more broadly
considered the legal system as an array of separate yet interlocking institutions. On the relationship between the
Hart and Wechsler approach to federal courts and the Hart and Sacks approach to legal process, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689-91 (1989) (book review).
293
See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 168-74.
285

44

procedures to reach the best results.294 Put another way, institutional settlement both assumes
and produces competent institutions—and, put together, institutional settlement around
competent institutions produces good, informed policy.295 A regulatory agency, for example,
acquires expert skill from its technical knowledge and the experience that it develops through
continuing administrative responsibility over a statutorily-created, regulatory scheme. The
agency devotes the entirety of its resources and time and for which it develops rules and
procedures.296 A narrowly-focused, expert agency thus has greater competency in the area in
which it operates than a court of general jurisdiction, which will have only a fleeting concern
about the statute, the agency, and its implementing program.297
A third concept arising out of the legal process school that is relevant to the Court’s
takings jurisprudence relates to the specific processes and competencies of the judiciary—or, as
the preface in the Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal courts stated, “what courts are good
for.”298 The Hart and Sacks materials presented a straightforward statement of these
competencies in contrast to those of political institutions: courts, Hart and Sacks advised, employ
reason, as constrained by established technique and procedure, to resolve a dispute. By contrast,
substantive policy disputes that can only be resolved by preference or “sheer guesswork” are
better “left to be made by count of noses at the ballot box.”299 Courts, unlike legislatures, utilize
“reasoned elaboration” in resolving a dispute, explicating the “general directive arrangement”
that it applies “in a way which is consistent with the other established application of it,” and “in a
way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses.”300 A court that interprets a
statute, therefore, must find the purpose of the statute and the general policy or principle it is
intended to further, and then reason towards a result consistent with the statute’s purpose;301
while a court that applies common law doctrine must similarly attempt to discern from precedent
the doctrine’s purpose and rule, principle, or standard, and elaborate how the court’s conclusions
about the case and controversy before it flow from the generally applicable law.302
Although the original legal process materials that Hart and Sacks developed concerned
statutory and general common law, other process advocates more explicitly extended the
approach’s insights to constitutional adjudication. As Hart’s student Alexander Bickel,303 among
others, characterized it, Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of state action works as
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part of an organic web of competent institutions with set tasks and competencies.304
Constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court is limited to guaranteeing certain basic civil
rights as a matter of positive law;305 protecting the integrity of the political process against
systematic distortion through exclusion or oppression of minorities;306 and, above all, to the wise
and prudent use of the Court’s jurisdiction and power in order to preserve the Court’s “mystic,”
legitimating function and to educate the nation as to correct constitutional principles.307 When
the Court wisely follows what Bickel famously called the “passive virtues” of avoiding
avoidable conflict, it insulates itself from controversial political decisions and allows other, more
directly accountable branches to assume the responsibility for resolving them.308 The judiciary’s
specific institutional competence, then, is to articulate and passively enforce impersonal and
enduring principles that would resolve, more through persuasion and education than through
coercion, the problem that judicial review of the democratically elected political branches is
distinctly counter-majoritarian.309
One final insight from legal process theory (although not unique to it310) will prove
helpful in understanding the Court’s takings jurisprudence—the institutional decision to rely
upon rules or standards in creating general directive arrangements.311 In order to bind itself and
other institutions that follow its directives, a court (or any institution that issues commands) may
place different degrees of definiteness in the form those directives take. It may decide to issue an
authoritative rule whose command is triggered upon the determination of facts; or it may decide
to grant a future decision-maker broader discretion though a standard that requires not only the
determination of facts, but also the appraisal of consequences, moral justifications, and human
experience.312 More likely, the institution will choose some point along a continuum between
these two poles, or it may include both rules and standards in its legal arrangements.313 The
choice of rules and standards is itself a decision based on considerations of institutional
competence—with what specificity, a drafter inquires, can I predict the regularity of disputes and
the correct resolution to them, or to what extent should I delegate determinations to a future
decision-maker?314
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Concerned with governing institutions rather than politics, and with procedures rather
than substance, legal process sought to preserve the status quo of post-war liberal consensus.315
Despite—and perhaps because of—its prominence, the approach has faced significant criticism
and revision, especially over the past two decades. Critics from both the critical left and the
utilitarian middle and right have challenged many of the legal process advocates’ most bedrock
concepts, including its assumptions that law could be divorced from policy, that the political
branches and regulatory agencies could operate free from capture by powerful interest groups,
and that the judiciary could formulate and follow an objective, external standard based solely
upon reason and prudence.316 Legal process’s vision of institutions in particular no longer
reflects the complicated operations of the contemporary federal, state, and local administrative
agency as an institution implementing public law programs in an advanced capitalist state, nor
does it compare well with more sophisticated theoretical approaches to understanding agency
structures and operations.317 In other words, critics have argued, legal process assumed too
much of institutions and procedures, and knew or predicted too little about the advancement of—
and frustrations with—the modern, postwar state.
Liberal and conservative proponents of civil liberties and rights have also asserted that
legal process was blind to enumerated constitutional rights, including the Takings Clause, and as
such embraced structure and process over rights.318 This criticism, too, focuses on the avoidance
of substantive issues in legal process—although it appears to view law as an instrumental means
to reach a primary goal of substantive ends, legal process remained fixed on process with such
obsession that the correct legal process emerged as an end in itself.319 As Morton Horwitz
declared, legal process abandoned the doctrinal formalism of the pre-legal realist era in favor of
an “institutional formalism” that fetishized abstract principles of governance rather than abstract
legal rules.320 No less than doctrinal formalism, which constituted a dominant underlying
jurisprudential and ideological structure shaping the doctrinal development of late 19th and early
20th century constitutional law,321 so legal process remains, fifty years after its emergence, a key
logic in the Court’s takings law.
B.

The Legal Process of Takings Law
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Rather than ushering in a rollback of the regulatory state,322 the federal constitutional
Takings Clause has now become suffused with legal process conceptions of passive judicial
review and deference to the decisions of other branches of government. Each of the 2005
decisions described or assumed the existence of a complicated set of institutions involved in the
land use regulatory process, each with its own significant role to play in reaching and
implementing important decisions, as well as in checking the authority of other institutions. And
each decision presented judicial review as a process of faithfully following precedent, fully
elaborating and explaining doctrine, and, ultimately, deferring to elected officials except in
narrowly defined instances when the government has clearly violated a well-articulated rule.
The Court conjured up the specter of property rights in its ritualistic invocation of fairness
principles and its concept of “functional equivalence,” but ultimately presented a judicial posture
and set of doctrines that place the Takings Clause squarely within the well-worn confines of
legal process.
1.
The Institutions of Land Use Regulation and Takings Litigation
The 2005 decisions display a great faith in settled allocations of decision-making, in the
relative competencies of the institutions in charge of land use controls, and in the institutional
system through which property owners challenge those controls. The majority in Kelo, for
example, described a local government that had relied upon a state statute for authority to engage
in comprehensive planning. The city “carefully formulated” and deliberated over an economic
development plan, and devised a redevelopment that sought to coordinate multiple uses of an
area that incidentally included petitioners’ homes.323 Unhappy citizens and property owners
could seek changes to these processes through the state legislatures and state constitution,324 as
well as in city elections. The institutions were well-settled and the procedures they used
appeared careful and trustworthy. Accordingly, they were constitutionally valid.
In San Remo, in addition to acknowledging Congress’s role in limiting its authority to reconsider state court decisions that settle federal constitutional claims,325 the majority described a
functional federal system in which state and federal courts share responsibility for judicial
review of constitutional claims, and in which the system’s individual parts operate in a
complimentary, efficient way to resolve disputes. It is a systemic strength rather than a
constitutional flaw that a plaintiff who follows the dictates of Williamson County files her initial
state claims in state court may never have a federal court consider her federal constitutional
claims.326 The Court’s assumption that “the weighty interests in finality and comity” outweigh
whatever advantages that takings’ plaintiffs might gain from the chance to argue their claims
before an additional court itself assumed thatthe institutional structure the court affirmed offered
significant advantages.327 First, the system’s parts are interchangeable—it should make no
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difference, for the purpose of constitutional adjudication, that a plaintiff begins in state or federal
court. Second, the administrative and judicial exhaustion requirement enables the best decisionmaker, a state court, to conduct the initial adjudication of a matter that is based on state
substantive and administrative law. Third, the importance of preserving the system’s
functionality and efficiency supersedes any efforts to protect an individual property owner from
state court adjudication that might allow her to bypass the system’s settled process. And fourth,
the system offers sufficient safeguards by allowing lower federal courts to consider federal
constitutional issues when the state constitution’s analogous provisions are not equivalent to the
federal constitution, and by assuring property owners that they can appeal adverse state court
judgments under federal constitutional law to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Lingle, too, invoked the institutional settlement of land use controls. Recall that the
Agins “substantial advancement” test made three fundamental errors: it mistook a substantive
due process test for a takings test; it reviewed the wrong end of a regulatory transaction by
considering the government’s purpose and actions rather than the regulation’s effects on a
property owner; and it invited a court to substitute its judgment for that of the government.328
The latter two errors—which follow from the first, doctrinal one—assumed that certain questions
regarding regulatory purpose and mechanics are for the judiciary to decide. This is exactly
backwards—under the Takings Clause, the judiciary only considers the regulatory effects on the
property owner.329
Obviously, deference is not a new concept to takings law. Courts have long recognized
that every extension of a constitutional right for compensation against a government’s use of its
police powers, and every extension of the public use requirement on eminent domain, is also a
limitation on long-settled and significant institutional authority that intrudes on legislative
prerogative over social policy,330 and that may cripple the government’s regulatory authority and
willingness to exercise it.331 But considered together as a comprehensive overview of the
Court’s approach to substantive and procedural takings doctrines, the 2005 decisions signal that
the Court’s primary focus is on administrative and judicial process rather than on the extent of
substantive property rights protections.
2.
The Limits of Judicial Competency and Judicial Review
The 2005 decisions exemplify a modest approach to judicial review in two ways: they
faithfully followed and elaborated upon precedent, and they upheld mostly open-ended standards
328
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that require lower courts to defer to the regulatory and eminent domain decisions of local
governments. In terms of precedent, both the San Remo majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
San Remo concurrence explained that they were bound by Williamson County’s exhaustion
requirement to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision, although the four-justice concurrence
indicated an interest in reconsidering the litigation exhaustion requirement.332 Lingle restated
and stitched all of the significant regulatory takings decisions of the Rehnquist and Burger
Courts together into a coherent whole—although it did so to overrule a stray part of one
longstanding decision.333
To understand Kelo’s fidelity to Berman and Midkiff, recall that Justice Thomas’s dissent
conceded that ruling against the government defendant would require overruling a century of
precedent interpreting the Public Use Clause.334 Justice O’Connor’s dissent attempted to find a
middle ground that would keep Berman and Midkiff’s deferential posture but excise the “errant
language” in those decisions that confused eminent domain authority with the police power.335
But even if the language to which Justice O’Connor objected were removed, the core of the
Court’s settled deference to legislative determinations under the Public Use Clause would still
stand—and, significantly, theKelo majority did not rely upon or even cite either the “errant
language” or the police power. As the majority noted, Justice O’Connor’s proposed reading of
public use precedent departed considerably both from the factual predicate of those decisions,
which did not require harmful uses in order to authorize the taking, and from those decisions’
examination only of the legislature’s purpose in the taking rather than the land’s future uses.336
All three decisions also provided fulsome explanations of the principles upon which they
relied—Kelo, in affirming the need to defer to well-formulated, authorized decisions of local
governments,337 San Remo, in affirming the need to respect state court judgments and authority
to decide federal constitutional claims,338 and Lingle, in explicating the regulatory takings
doctrine.339 Lingle is especially telling in this regard. Recall that Lingle performed two
significant moves: it found an unbroken narrative in the messy development of regulatory
takings doctrine, and it discerned a basic principle that explained a complicated set of default
standards and exceptional rules.340 Due both to its unanimity and its effort to restate and justify
the universe of takings tests, Lingle is the most authoritative regulatory takings decision since
Penn Central, notwithstanding the fact that the question presented to the Court merely required it
to explain and justify a stray doctrine that had never been enforced by the Supreme Court.
Doing so, Lingle also exemplified the 2005 decisions’ effort to match the proper legal
form to the degree of deference that the lower courts should give the decisions of political and
administrative agencies. Lingle explained that outside of the “two relatively narrow categories”
332
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of “per se” takings and the “special application” of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for
certain types of development conditions, courts should apply the multi-factor Penn Central
standard.341 To the former, narrowly-defined set of regulations, courts must apply the heightened
scrutiny of strong rules; to the latter, much larger category courts must apply the more deferential
standard. Kelo similarly directed lower courts through legal form, refusing to adopt any “rigid
formulas and intensive scrutiny” and choosing instead to defer to the legislative determination of
public use.342 The Court rejected both a strict “use by the public” rule, which would limit the
legislature’s authority to respond to the “always evolving needs of society,”343 and Justice
O’Connor’s suggestion of a middle ground between a narrow, bright-line rule and a deferential
standard,344 arguing that any test other than a deferential one would lead courts to review the
wisdom of the legislature’s determination and would ultimately cause legislative and regulatory
uncertainty and delays in the planning and redevelopment process.345 The Court thus offered a
legal standard so open-ended and deferential that it left open the question of when, short of clear
evidence of corruption, a taking for economic development purposes is sufficiently suspect to
warrant invalidation.346
For the 2005 decisions, judicial competency extended to the question of decisional
allocation and to the legal form of those decisions—with the assumption that the form will likely
be some type of deferential standard—but not to the substantive matter of property rights. And
thus the legal process of takings includes not only judicial competency but also the presumed
competency of political and regulatory institutions as well as the system within which all of the
relevant institutions have their place. The Court has shifted its focus from the protection of an
individual’s constitutional property rights from interference by the regulatory state to the
decisional authority and processes of the regulatory state itself.
Conclusion: The Satisfactions and Frustrations of Takings Process
When courts adhere to the legal process approach, they resolve disputes conservatively—
that is, in a jurisprudential, rather than political, sense. Legal process constrains judicial efforts
to overturn precedent, especially when the motives reflect ideological reasons—although in
doing so, of course, the legal process approach has the ideological effect of protecting the status
quo and stabilizing constitutional common law.347 In addition, legal process pushes courts to
accept and affirm an existing system of governance and existing distributions of entitlements,
rather than risk judicial legitimacy by imposing counter-majoritarian judgments against the will
341
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of politically accountable institutions.348 And legal process counsels courts to avoid substantive
legal issues that concern significant social and political problems, and focustheir attention
instead on procedural and institutional issues.349 Legal process, in short, is a theory of judicial
restraint that, when adopted, constrains courts that might otherwise depart from existing legal
and political arrangements.
This Article has proposed that the predominance of a legal process approach to takings
explains the very different approach taken in the Court’s 2005 decisions, when government
defendants won in Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo, from that taken in the 1986 Term, when
government defendants lost in three of the four decisions.350 Two decades ago, the Court flirted
with an active jurisprudence that found the existence of institutional failure that resulted in
constitutionally suspect regulation; now, I have argued, the Court has fallen back to the “passive
virtue” of deference to political institutions and a focus on process, and as a result has found
constitutionally sufficient procedures that resulted in losing plaintiffs neither receiving
compensation nor enjoining government actions.
The advantage of the latter, present approach is that it avoids conflicts with other
branches of government—and especially, in the case of the application of the Takings Clause to
land use controls, with the several states and their subsidiary agencies. And as with the
somewhat ironic result that it is the liberal, pro-regulatory justices that embrace federalist
rhetoric in takings decisions, so it is that the same justices also embrace a deferential, restrained
approach to judicial review in the takings context when they may be less willing to do so in other
substantive areas of law.351 Richard Lazarus has complained that conservative Supreme Court
justices, whether because of their apathy or antipathy towards environmental law, treat
environmental statutes as merely another branch of administrative law and defer to the political
branches whenever statutory language allows the Court to do so.352 In takings law, it is liberal
justices who treat the open-ended language of the Fifth Amendment as a type of administrative
law that requires deference to political branches utilizing their police and eminent domain
powers. But leaving aside whatever instrumentally ideological objectives the justices may
harbor, legal process teaches that it is inherently satisfactory and downright virtuous to resolve a
difficult question by deferring to the decision another branch of government, which is itself part
of a well-considered complex of administrative institutions and procedures.
But it can also be a frustrating way to resolve constitutional disputes,, especially when the
public that wants a better, more understandable explanation. Judicial passivity and institutional
settlement may seem the logical choice to many judges and jurisprudes, but they sound unduly
technocratic and mistaken, if not outrageous, in the context of an “ownership society” and a
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culture committed to the single family home.353 If nothing else, the response to Kelo
demonstrates the disjuncture between the quasi-scientific observations of legal process and the
populist sentiments of the public and the anti-Kelo coalition.354 Taking their cue from the
majority decision,355 political officials and property rights advocates have responded with a
plethora of constitutional and legislative proposals at the federal and state level to limit economic
development takings.356 Although their actions are consistent with the tenets of legal process
that would encourage political actors rather than judges to make significant, controversial
political decisions, the fact that judicial passivity is deemed actively offensive by a broad
segment of the public is more than a little ironic.
Legal process is also a frustrating approach for academics who would prefer a more
candid, rigorous effort to defend or penalize government efforts to control land use. How does
the Court know that the institutions it presumes are competent, which use procedures it also
presumes are competent, in fact produce decisions that benefit the public and do not place an
excessive burden on individual property owners? The answer in Kelo is unclear, because the
Court refused to enunciate a test;357 the answer in Lingle is based on over- and under-inclusive
proxy tests for onerous regulatory burdens;358 and the answer in San Remo is that a frustrated
plaintiff who loses in state court may still file a petition for certiorari and hope for Supreme
Court review.359 Although legal process concepts such as institutional settlement and
competency certainly have both normative and rhetorical appeal as principles that suggest
offering judicial deference to other governmental bodies, they suffer as concepts of governance
is their presumptive nature, as the Court’s largely procedural answers to substantive questions
demonstrate.
The legal process of the 2005 decisions rests on heroic assumptions about an agency’s
structural, rather than actual, competence.360 It makes minimal effort to perform the difficult
empirical task of comparative institutional analysis to identify which institutions more
effectively perform certain tasks—the answer for which may not rest at all on the institution’s
structural position or procedures.361 Accordingly, the 2005 decisions appear like thin gruel to
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government advocates as well, given the Court’s unwillingness to actively affirm the state action
under review.362 In this regard, Kelo pales considerably in comparison to Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,363 which almost eighty years earlier had upheld against constitutional
challenge an early zoning ordinance in part because of the Court’s confidence in the
comprehensiveness, “painstaking consideration,” and overall wisdom of the expert commissions
that engaged in land use planning.364 In Kelo, the majority appeared less confident of the
wisdom of the city’s actions, considering it sufficient that New London’s procedures met a
process-oriented constitutional baseline.
Merely rejecting or ignoring legal process insights may be no less frustrating, however.
Imagine if the doubts expressed in the San Remo concurrence about the wisdom of requiring
plaintiffs to exhaust state court remedies, as well as state administrative remedies, bore fruit and
that aspect of Williamson County was overturned.365 Would the lower federal courts do a fairer,
more effective job of resolving land use disputes? A number of federal judges emphatically
think not.366
More dramatically, imagine if the Roberts Court decided to overturn or limit the majority
decision in Kelo and impose a stricter, rule-like limit under the Public Use Clause on eminent
domain actions that result in the taken property ending up in private hands. The Court’s
institutional settlement of its regulatory takings doctrine in Lingle demonstrates the hurdles
facing that effort. After more than a generation of experimentation with heightened judicial
scrutiny of regulatory actions under the Takings Clause, the Court has decided, ultimately, to
“eat crow” and scale back its regulatory takings jurisprudence.367 Any effort to re-invigorate
constitutional property rights protections under the Takings Clause faces a difficult choice. It
could abandon the Rehnquist Court’s ultimate commitment to legal process theory, and consider
some other jurisprudential approach to constitutional challenges under the Takings Clause; or, if
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it decides to remain within the comforting confines of legal process, it will face the same
doctrinal and adjudicatory challenge of defining the extent of substantive constitutional property
rights and the limits of governmental actions that produced the wondrous complexity of the
regulatory takings doctrine. We could end up a decade hence with a muddled Public Use Clause
doctrine, and all of the attendant judicial confusion and law review commentary. In other words,
the Roberts Court would be required to walk a difficult tightrope between the passively virtuous
respect for political institutions that legal process prescribes and the substantive intervention into
the work those institutions perform that more fulsome property rights protection would demand.
The 2005 decisions have placed this dilemma in the foreground. They may have put to
rest the major issues arising out of Takings Clause, but they do not do so satisfactorily. The fact
that they do so at all, however, is an accomplishment attributable in no small part to the
continuing salience of legal process.
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